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Abstract
This paper illustrates how one can deduce preference from observed choices when attention
is not only limited but also random. In contrast to earlier approaches, we introduce a Random
Attention Model (RAM) where we abstain from any particular attention formation, and instead
consider a large class of nonparametric random attention rules. Our model imposes one intuitive
condition, termed Monotonic Attention, which captures the idea that each consideration set
competes for the decision-maker’s attention. We then develop revealed preference theory within
RAM and obtain precise testable implications for observable choice probabilities. Based on
these theoretical findings, we propose econometric methods for identification, estimation, and
inference of the decision maker’s preferences. To illustrate the applicability of our results and
their concrete empirical content in specific settings, we also develop revealed preference theory
and accompanying econometric methods under additional nonparametric assumptions on the
consideration set for binary choice problems. Finally, we provide general purpose software
implementation of our estimation and inference results, and showcase their performance using
simulations.
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1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory is not only a cornerstone of modern economics, but is also the source
of important theoretical, methodological and policy implications for many social and behavioral
sciences. This theory aims to identify the preferences of a decision maker (e.g., an individual
or a firm) from her observed choices (e.g., buying a house or hiring a worker). In its classical
formulation, revealed preference theory assumes that the decision maker selects the best available
option after full consideration of all possible alternatives presented to her. This assumption leads to
specific testable implications based on observed choice patterns but, unfortunately, empirical testing
of classical revealed preference theory shows that it is not always compatible with observed choice
behavior (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990; Goeree, 2008; van Nierop et al., 2010; Honka, Hortac¸su, and
Vitorino, 2017). For example, Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, and Rangel (2011) provides interesting
experimental evidence against the full attention assumption using eye tracking and choice data.
Motivated by these findings, and the fact that certain theoretically important and empirically
relevant choice patterns can not be explained using classical revealed preference theory based on full
attention, scholars have proposed other economic models of choice behavior. An alternative is the
limited attention model (Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay, 2012; Lleras, Masatlioglu, Nakajima,
and Ozbay, 2017; Dean, Kıbrıs, and Masatlioglu, 2017), where decision makers are assumed to select
the best available option from a subset of all possible alternatives, known as the consideration
set. This framework takes the formation of the consideration set, also known as attention rule
or consideration map, as unobservable and hence as an intrinsic feature of the decision maker.
Nonetheless, it is possible to develop a fruitful theory of revealed preference within this framework,
employing only mild and intuitive nonparametric restrictions on how the decision maker decides to
focus attention on specific subsets of all possible alternatives presented to her.
Until very recently, limited attention models have been deterministic, a feature that diminished
their empirical applicability: testable implications via revealed preference have relied on the as-
sumption that the decision maker pays attention to the same subset of options every time she is
confronted with the same set of available alternatives. This requires that, for example, an online
shopper uses always the same keyword and the same search engine (e.g. Google) on the same
platform (e.g. tablet) to look for a product. This is obviously restrictive, and can lead to predic-
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tions that are inconsistent with observed choice behavior. Aware of this fact, a few scholars have
improved deterministic limited attention models by allowing for stochastic attention (Manzini and
Mariotti, 2014; Aguiar, 2015; Brady and Rehbeck, 2016; Horan, 2018), which permits the decision
maker to pay attention to different subsets with some non-zero probability given the same set of
alternatives to choose from. All available results in this literature proceed by first parameterizing
the attention rule (i.e., committing to a particular parametric attention rule), and then studying
the revealed preference implications of these parametric models.
In contrast to earlier approaches, we introduce a Random Attention Model (RAM) where we
abstain from any specific parametric (stochastic) attention rule, and instead consider a large class
of nonparametric random attention rules. Our model imposes one intuitive condition, termed
Monotonic Attention, which is satisfied by many stochastic attention rules. Given that consideration
sets are unobservable, this feature is crucial for applicability of our revealed preference results, as our
findings and empirical implications are valid under many different, particular attention rules that
could be operating in the background. In other words, our revealed preference results are derived
from nonparametric restrictions on the attention rule and hence are more robust to misspecification
biases.
RAM is best suited for eliciting information about the preference ordering of a single decision-
making unit when her choices are observed repeatedly.1 For example, scanner data keeps track of
the same single consumer’s purchases across repeated visits, where the grocery store adjusts product
varieties and arrangements regularly. Another example is web advertising on digital platforms, such
as search engines or shopping sites, where not only abundant records from each individual decision
maker are available, but also it is common to see manipulations/experiments altering the options
offered to them. A third example is given in Kawaguchi, Uetake, and Watanabe (2016), where
large data on each consumer’s choices from vending machines (with varying product availability)
is analyzed. In addition, our model can be used empirically with aggregate data on a group of
distinct decision makers, provided each of them may differ on what they pay attention to but all
share the same preference.
1The finding that individual choices frequently exhibit randomness was first reported in Tversky (1969) and has
now been illustrated by Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) and numerous other studies. Similar to our work, Manzini
and Mariotti (2014), Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015), and Brady and Rehbeck (2016), among others, have
developed models which allow the analyst to reveal information about the agent’s preferences from her observed
random choices.
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Our key identifying assumption, Monotonic Attention, restricts the possibly stochastic attention
formation process in a very intuitive way: each consideration set competes for the decision maker’s
attention, and hence the probability of paying attention to a particular subset is assumed not to
decrease when the total number of possible consideration sets decreases. We show that this single
nonparametric assumption is general enough to nest most (if not all) previously proposed determin-
istic and random limited attention models. Furthermore, under our proposed monotonic attention
assumption, we are able to develop a theory of revealed preference, obtain specific testable impli-
cations, and (partially) identify the underlying preferences of the decision maker by investigating
her observed choice probabilities. Our revealed preference results are applicable to a wide range
of attention rules, including the parametric ones currently available in the literature which, as we
show, satisfy the monotonic attention assumption.
Based on these theoretical findings, we also develop econometric results for identification, esti-
mation, and inference of the decision maker’s preferences, as well as specification testing of RAM.
We show that RAM implies that the set of partially identified preference orderings containing the
decision maker’s true preferences is equivalent to a set of inequality restrictions on the choice prob-
abilities (one for each preference ordering in the identified set). This result allows us to employ the
identifiable/estimable choice probabilities to (i) develop a model specification test (i.e., test whether
there exists a non-empty set of preference orderings compatible with RAM), (ii) conduct hypothesis
testing on specific preference orderings (i.e., test whether the inequality constraints on the choice
probabilities are satisfied), and (iii) develop confidence sets containing the decision maker’s true
preferences with pre-specified coverage (i.e., via test inversion). Our econometric methods rely on
ideas and results from the literature on partially identified models and moment inequality testing:
see Canay and Shaikh (2017), Ho and Rosen (2017) and Molinari (2019) for recent reviews and
further references.
RAM is fully nonparametric and agnostic because it relies on the monotonic attention assumption
only. As a consequence, it may lead to relatively weak testable implications in some applications,
that is, “little” revelation or a “large” identified set of preferences. However, RAM also provides
a basis for incorporating additional (parametric and) nonparametric restrictions that can substan-
tially improve identification power. In this paper, we illustrate how RAM can be combined with
additional, mild nonparametric restrictions to tighten identification in non-trivial ways: in Section
3
5.1, we incorporate an additional restriction on attention rule for binary choice problems, and show
that this alone leads to important revelation improvements within RAM. We also illustrate this
result numerically in our simulation study.
Finally, we implement our estimation and inference methods in the general-purpose software pack-
age ramchoice for R—see https://cran.r-project.org/package=ramchoice for details. Our
novel identification results allow us to develop inference methods that avoid optimization over the
possibly high-dimensional space of attention rules, leading to methods that are very fast and easy
to implement when applied to realistic empirical problems. See the Supplemental Appendix for
numerical evidence.
Our work contributes to both economic theory and econometrics. We describe several examples
covered by our model in Section 2.1 after we introduce our proposed RAM. We also discuss in detail
the connections and distinctions between this paper and the economic theory literature in Section
SA.1 of the Supplemental Appendix. In particular, we show how RAM nests and/or connects
to the recent work by Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Brady and Rehbeck (2016), Gul, Natenzon,
and Pesendorfer (2014), Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018), Echenique and Saito (2019),
Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015), and Aguiar, Boccardi, and Dean (2016), among others.
This paper is also related to a rich econometric literature on nonparametric identification, es-
timation and inference both in the specific context of random utility models, and more generally.
See Matzkin (2013) for a review and further references on nonparametric identification, Hausman
and Newey (2017) for a recent review and further references on nonparametric welfare analysis,
and Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014), Kawaguchi (2017), Kitamura and Stoye (2018), and
Deb, Kitamura, Quah, and Stoye (2018) for a sample of recent contributions and further references.
As mentioned above, a key feature of RAM is that our proposed monotonic attention condition on
attention rule nests previous models as special cases, and also covers many new models of choice
behavior. In particular, RAM can accommodate more choice behaviors/patterns than what can be
rationalized by random utility models. This is important because numerous studies in psychology,
finance and marketing have shown that decision makers exhibit limited attention when making
choices: they only compare (and choose from) a subset of all available options. Whenever decision
makers do not pay full attention to all options, implications from revealed preference theory under
random utility models no longer hold in general, implying that empirical testing of substantive
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hypotheses as well as policy recommendations based on random utility models will be invalid. On
the other hand, our results may remain valid.
In contemporaneous work, a few scholars have also developed identification and inference results
under (random) limited attention, trying to connect behavioral theory and econometric methods,
as we do in this paper. Three recent examples of this new research area include Abaluck and Adams
(2017), Dardanoni, Manzini, Mariotti, and Tyson (2018), and Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and
Teitelbaum (2018). These papers are complementary to ours insofar different assumptions on the
random attention rule and preference(s) are imposed, which lead to different levels of (partial)
identification of preference(s) and (random) attention rule(s). For a further discussion on the
relationship with these papers, see Section SA.1 of the Supplemental Appendix.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup, where our key
monotonicity assumption on the decision maker’s stochastic attention rule is presented in Section
2.1. Section 3 discusses in detail our random attention model, including the main revealed prefer-
ence results. Section 4 presents our main econometrics methods, including nonparametric (partial)
identification, estimation, and inference results. In Section 5.1, we consider additional restrictions
on the attention rule for binary choice problems, which can help improve our identification and
inference results considerably. We also consider random attention filters in Section 5.2, which are
one of the motivating examples of monotonic attention rules. In this case, however, there is no ad-
ditional identification. Section 6 summarizes the findings from a simulation study. Finally, Section
7 concludes with a discussion of directions for future research. A companion online Supplemental
Appendix includes more examples, extensions and other methodological results, omitted proofs,
and additional simulation evidence.
2 Setup
We designate a finite set X to act as the universal set of all mutually exclusive alternatives. This
set is thus viewed as the grand alternative space, and is kept fixed throughout. A typical element
of X is denoted by a and its cardinality is |X| = K. We let X denote the set of all non-empty
subsets of X. Each member of X defines a choice problem.
Definition 1 (Choice Rule). A choice rule is a map pi : X × X → [0, 1] such that for all S ∈ X ,
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pi(a|S) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ S, pi(a|S) = 0 for all a /∈ S, and ∑
a∈S
pi(a|S) = 1.
Thus, pi(a|S) represents the probability that the decision maker chooses alternative a from the
choice problem S. Our formulation allows both stochastic and deterministic choice rules. If pi(a|S)
is either 0 or 1, then choices are deterministic. For simplicity in the exposition, we assume that
all choice problems are potentially observable throughout the main paper, but this assumption is
relaxed in Section SA.3 of the Supplemental Appendix to account for cases where only data on a
subcollection of choice problems is available.
The key ingredient in our model is probabilistic consideration sets. Given a choice problem S,
each non-empty subset of S could be a consideration set with certain probability. We impose that
each frequency is between 0 and 1 and that the total frequency adds up to 1. Formally,
Definition 2 (Attention Rule). An attention rule is a map µ : X × X → [0, 1] such that for all
S ∈ X , µ(T |S) ≥ 0 for all T ⊂ S, µ(T |S) = 0 for all T 6⊂ S, and ∑
T⊂S
µ(T |S) = 1.
Thus, µ(T |S) represents the probability of paying attention to the consideration set T ⊂ S when
the choice problem is S. This formulation captures both deterministic and stochastic attention
rules. For example, µ(S|S) = 1 represents an agent with full attention. Given our approach, we
can always extract the probability of paying attention to a specific alternative: For a given a ∈ S,∑
a∈T⊂S
µ(T |S) is the probability of paying attention to a in the choice problem S. The probabilities
on consideration sets allow us to derive the attention probabilities on alternatives uniquely.
2.1 Monotonic Attention
We consider a choice model where a decision maker picks the maximal alternative with respect
to her preference among the alternatives she pays attention to. Our ultimate goal is to elicit her
preferences from observed choice behavior without requiring any information on consideration sets.
Of course, this is impossible without any restrictions on her (possibly random) attention rule. For
example, a decision maker’s choice can always be rationalized by assuming she only pays attention
to singleton sets. Because the consumer never considers two alternatives together, one cannot infer
her preferences at all.
We propose a property (i.e., an identifying restriction) on how stochastic consideration sets change
as choice problems change, as opposed to explicitly modeling how the choice problem determines
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the consideration set. We argue below that this nonparametric property is indeed satisfied by many
problems of interest and mimics heuristics people use in real life (see examples below and in Section
SA.2 of the Supplemental Appendix). This approach makes it possible to apply our method to elicit
preference without relying on a particular formation mechanism of consideration sets.
Assumption 1 (Monotonic Attention). For any a ∈ S − T , µ(T |S) ≤ µ(T |S − a).
Monotonic µ captures the idea that each consideration set competes for consumers’ attention:
the probability of a particular consideration set does not shrink when the number of possible
consideration sets decreases. Removing an alternative that does not belong to the consideration
set T results in less competition for T , hence the probability of T being the consideration set in
the new choice problem is weakly higher. Our assumption is similar to the regularity condition
proposed by Suppes and Luce (1965). The key difference is that their regularity condition is defined
on choice probabilities, while our assumption is defined on attention probabilities.
To demonstrate the richness of the framework and motivate the analysis to follow, we discuss
six leading examples of families of monotonic attention rules, that is, attention rules satisfying
Assumption 1. We offer several more examples in Section SA.2 of the Supplemental Appendix.
The first example is deterministic (i.e., µ(T |S) is either 0 or 1), but the others are all stochastic.
1. (Attention Filter; Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay, 2012) A large class of deterministic
attention rules, leading to consideration sets that do not change if an item not attracting
attention is made unavailable (Attention Filter), was introduced by Masatlioglu, Nakajima,
and Ozbay (2012). A classical example in this class is when a decision maker considers all the
items appearing in the first page of search results and overlooks the rest. Formally, let Γ(S)
be the deterministic consideration set when the choice problem is S, and hence Γ(S) ⊂ S.
Then, Γ is an Attention Filter if when a /∈ Γ(S), then Γ(S − a) = Γ(S). In our framework,
this class corresponds to the case µ(T |S) = 1 if T = Γ(S), and 0 otherwise.
2. (Random Attention Filters) Consider a decision maker whose attention is deterministic
but utilizes different deterministic attention filters on different occasions. For example, it
is well-known that search behavior on distinct platforms (mobile, tablet, and desktop) is
drastically different (e.g., the same search engine produces different first page lists depending
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on the platform, or different platforms utilize different search algorithms). In such cases,
while the consideration set comes from a (deterministic) attention filter for each platform,
the resulting consideration set is random. Formally, if a decision maker utilizes each attention
filter Γj with probability ψj , then the attention rule can be written as
µ(T |S) =
∑
j
1(Γj(S) = T ) · ψj .
We will pay special attention to this class of attention rules in Section 5.2.
3. (Independent Consideration; Manzini and Mariotti, 2014) Consider a decision maker who
pays attention to each alternative a with a fixed probability γ(a) ∈ (0, 1). γ represents the
degree of brand awareness for a product, or the willingness of an agent to seriously evaluate
a political candidate. The frequency of each set being the consideration set can be expressed
as follows: for all T ⊂ S,
µ(T |S) = 1
βS
∏
a∈T
γ(a)
∏
a∈S−T
(1− γ(a)),
where βS = 1 −
∏
a∈S
(1 − γ(a)), which represents the probability that the decision maker
considers no alternative in S, is used to adjust each probability so that they sum up to 1.
4. (Logit Attention; Brady and Rehbeck, 2016) Consider a decision maker who assigns a
positive weight for each non-empty subset of X. Psychologically wT is a strength associated
with the subset T . The probability of considering T in S can be written as follows:
µ(T |S) = wT∑
T ′⊂S
wT ′
.
Even though there is no structure on weights in the general version of this model, there are
two interesting special cases where weights solely depend on the size of the set. These are
wT = |T | and wT = 1|T | , which are conceptually different. In the latter, the decision maker
tends to have smaller consideration sets, while larger consideration sets are more likely in the
former.
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5. (Dogit Attention) This example is a generalization of Logit Attention, and is based on
the idea of the Dogit model (Gaundry and Dagenais, 1979). A decision maker is captive to a
particular consideration set with certain probability, to the extent that she pays attention to
that consideration set regardless of the weights of other possible consideration sets. Formally,
let
µ(T |S) = 1
1 +
∑
T ′⊂S θT ′
wT∑
T ′⊂S wT ′
+
θT
1 +
∑
T ′⊂S θT ′
,
where θT ≥ 0 represents the degree of captivity (impulsivity) of T . The “captivity parameter”
reflects the attachment of a decision maker to a certain consideration set. Since wT are non-
negative, the second term, which is independent of wT , is the smallest lower bound for µ(T |S).
The larger θT , the more likely the decision maker is to be captive to T and pays attention to
it. When θT = 0 for all T , this model becomes Logit Attention. This formulation is able to
distinguish between impulsive and deliberate attention behavior.
6. (Elimination by Aspects) Consider a decision maker who intentionally or unintentionally
focuses on a certain “aspect” of alternatives, and then refuses or ignores those alternatives
that do not possess that aspect. This model is similar in spirit to Tversky (1972). Let
{j, k, `, . . . } be the set of aspects. Let ωj represent the probability that aspect j “draws
attention to itself.” It reflects the salience and/or importance of aspect j. All alternatives
without that aspect fail to receive attention. Let Bj be the set of alternatives that posses
aspect j. We assume that each alternative must belong to at least one Bj with ωj > 0. If
aspect j is the salient aspect, the consideration set is Bj ∩ S when S is the set of feasible
alternatives. The total probability of T being the consideration set is the sum of ωj such that
T = Bj ∩ S. When there is no alternative in S possessing the salient aspect, a new aspect
will be drawn. Formally, the probability of T being the consideration set under S is given by
µ(T |S) =
∑
Bj∩S=T
ωj∑
Bk∩S 6=∅ ωk
.
These six examples give a sample of different limited attention models of interest in economics,
psychology, marketing, and many other disciplines. While these examples are quite distinct from
9
each other, all of them are monotonic attention rules.2 As a consequence, our revealed preference
characterization will be applicable to a wide range of choice rules without committing to a particular
attention mechanism, which is not observable in practice and hence untestable. Furthermore, as
illustrated by the examples above (and those in Section SA.2 of the Supplemental Appendix), our
upcoming characterization, identification, estimation, and inference results nest important previous
contributions in the literature.
3 A Random Attention Model
We are ready to introduce our random attention model based on Assumption 1. We assume the
decision maker has a strict preference ordering  on X. To be precise, we assume the preference
ordering is an asymmetric, transitive and complete binary relation. A binary relation  on a set
X is (i) asymmetric, if for all x, y ∈ X, x  y implies y 6 x; (ii) transitive, if for all x, y, z ∈ X,
x  y and y  z imply x  z; and (iii) complete, if for all x 6= y ∈ X, either x  y or y  x is
true. Consequently, the decision maker always picks the maximal alternative with respect to her
preference among the alternatives she pays attention to. Formally,
Definition 3 (Random Attention Representation). A choice rule pi has a random attention rep-
resentation if there exists a preference ordering  over X and a monotonic attention rule µ (As-
sumption 1) such that
pi(a|S) =
∑
T⊂S
1(a is -best in T ) · µ(T |S)
for all a ∈ S and S ∈ X . In this case, we say pi is represented by (, µ). We may also say that
 represents pi, which means that there exists some monotonic attention rule µ such that (, µ)
represents pi. We also say pi is a Random Attention Model (RAM).
While our framework is designed to model stochastic choices, it captures deterministic choices
as well. In classical choice theory, a decision maker chooses the best alternative according to her
preferences with probability 1, hence choice is deterministic. In our framework, this case is captured
2To provide an example where Assumption 1 might be violated, consider a generalization of Independent Consid-
eration of Manzini and Mariotti (2014). In this generalization, the degree of brand awareness for a product is not
only a function of the product but also a function of the context, that is, γS(a). Then, the frequency of each set
being the consideration set is calculated as in Independent Consideration rule. Due to this contextual dependence,
further restrictions on γS(a) and γS−b(a) are needed to ensure Assumption 1.
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by a monotone attention rule with µ(S|S) = 1. Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of RAM.
S T a is -best in T
µ(T |S)
Attention Rule

Preference
Choice Problem Consideration Set Choice
pi(a|S)
Choice Rule
Figure 1. Illustration of a RAM. Observable: choice problem and choice (solid line). Unobservable:
attention rule, consideration set and preference (dashed line).
We now derive the implications of our random attention model. They can be used to test the
model in terms of observed choice rules/probabilities. In this section, we treat the choice rule
as known/observed in order to facilitate the discussion of preference elicitation. In practice, the
researcher may only observe a set of choice problems and choices thereof. We discuss economet-
ric implementation in Section 4: even if the choice rule is not directly observed, it is identified
(consistently estimable) from choice data.
In the literature, there is a principle called regularity (see Suppes and Luce, 1965), according to
which adding a new alternative should only decrease the probability of choosing one of the existing
alternatives. However, empirical findings suggest otherwise. Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers
(2006) provide a detailed review of empirical evidence on violations of regularity and alternative
theories explaining these violations. Importantly, our model allows regularity violations.
The next example illustrates that adding an alternative to the feasible set can increase the likeli-
hood that an existing alternative is selected. This cannot be accommodated in the Luce (multino-
mial logit) model, nor in any random utility model. In RAM, the addition of an alternative changes
the choice set and therefore the decision maker’s attention, which could increase the probability of
an existing alternative being chosen.
Example 1 (Regularity Violation). Let X = {a, b, c} and consider two nested choice problems
{a, b, c} and {a, b}. Imagine a decision maker with a  b  c and the following monotonic atten-
tion rule µ. Each row corresponds to a different choice problem and columns represent possible
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consideration sets.
µ(T |S) T = {a, b, c} {a, b} {a, c} {b, c} {a} {b} {c}
S = {a, b, c} 2/3 0 0 1/6 0 0 1/6
{a, b} 1/2 0 1/2
{a, c} 1/2 0 1/2
{b, c} 1/2 0 1/2
Then pi(a|{a, b, c}) = 2/3 > 1/2 = pi(a|{a, b}) = pi(a|{a, c}). y
This example shows that RAM can explain choice patterns that cannot be explained by the
classical random utility model. Given that the model allows regularity violations, one might think
that the model has very limited empirical implications, i.e. that it is too general to have empir-
ical content. However, it is easy to find a choice rule pi that lies outside RAM with only three
alternatives. Here we provide an example where our model makes very sharp predictions.
Example 2 (RAM Violation). The following choice rule pi is not compatible with our random
attention model as long as the decision maker chooses each alternative with positive probability
from the set {a, b, c}, i.e., λaλbλc > 0. Each column corresponds to a different choice problem.
pi(·|S) S = {a, b, c} {a, b} {a, c} {b, c}
a λa 1 0
b λb 0 1
c λc 1 0
We now illustrate that pi is not a RAM. Since the choice behavior is symmetric among all binary
choices, without loss of generality, assume a  b  c. Given that c is the worst alternative, {c} is
the only consideration set in which c can be chosen. Hence the decision maker must consider the
consideration set {c} with probability λc (i.e., µ({c}|{a, b, c}) = λc). Assumption 1 implies that
µ({c}|{b, c}) must be greater than λc > 0. This yields a contradiction since pi(c|{b, c}) = 0. In
sum, given the above binary choices, our model predicts that when the choice set is {a, b, c} the
decision maker must choose at least one alternative with 0 probability, which is a stark prediction
in probabilistic choice. y
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One might wonder that the model makes a strong prediction due to the cyclical binary choices,
i.e., pi(a|{a, b}) = pi(b|{b, c}) = pi(c|{a, c}) = 1. We can generate a similar prediction where the
individual is perfectly rational in the binary choices, i.e., pi(a|{a, b}) = pi(a|{a, c}) = pi(b|{b, c}) = 1.
In this case, our model predicts that the individual cannot chose both b and c with strictly positive
probability when the choice problem is {a, b, c}. Therefore, we obtain similar predictions. Given
that RAM has non-trivial empirical content, it is natural to investigate to what extent Assumption
1 can be used to elicit (unobserved) strict preference orderings given (observed) choices of decision
makers.
3.1 Revealed Preference
In general, a choice rule can have multiple RAM representations with different preference orderings
and different attention rules. When multiple representations are possible, we say that a is revealed
to be preferred to b if and only if a is preferred to b in all possible RAM representations. This is
a very conservative approach as it ensures that we never make false claims about the preference of
the decision maker.
Definition 4 (Revealed Preference). Let {(j , µj)}j=1,...,J be all random attention representations
of pi. We say that a is revealed to be preferred to b if a j b for all j.
We now show how revealed preference theory can still be developed successfully in our RAM
framework. If all representations share the same preferences  (or if there is a unique representa-
tion), then the revealed preference will be equal to . In general, if one wants to know whether a
is revealed to be preferred to b, it would appear necessary to identify all possible (j , µj) represen-
tations. However, this is not practical, especially when there are many alternatives. Instead, we
shall now provide a handy method to obtain the revealed preference completely.
Our theoretical strategy parallels that of Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012) (MNO) in
their study of a deterministic model of inattention. MNO identifies a as revealed preferred to b
whenever a is chosen in the presence of b, and removing b causes a choice reversal. This particular
observation, in conjunction with the structure of attention filters, ensures that the decision maker
considers b while choosing a. Here, we show that a is revealed preferred to b if removing b causes
a regularity violation, that is, pi(a|S) > pi(a|S − b). To see this, assume (, µ) represents pi and
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pi(a|S) > pi(a|S − b). By definition, we have
pi(a|S) =
∑
T⊂S,
a is -best in T
µ(T |S)
=
∑
b∈T⊂S,
a is -best in T
µ(T |S) +
∑
b/∈T⊂S,
a is -best in T
µ(T |S)
≤
∑
b∈T⊂S,
a is -best in T
µ(T |S) +
∑
T⊂S−b,
a is -best in T
µ(T |S − b) (by Assumption 1)
=
∑
b∈T⊂S,
a is -best in T
µ(T |S) + pi(a|S − b).
Hence, we have the following inequality:
pi(a|S)− pi(a|S − b) ≤
∑
b∈T⊂S,
a is -best in T
µ(T |S)
Since pi(a|S)−pi(a|S−b) > 0, there must exist at least one T such that (i) b ∈ T , (ii) a is -best in T ,
and (iii) µ(T |S) 6= 0. Therefore, there exists at least one occasion that the decision maker pays
attention to b while choosing a (Revealed Preference). The next lemma summarizes this interesting
relationship between regularity violations and revealed preferences. It simply illustrates that the
existence of a regularity violation informs us about the underlying preference.
Lemma 1. Let pi be a RAM. If pi(a|S) > pi(a|S − b), then a is revealed to be preferred to b.
Lemma 1 allows us to define the following binary relation. For any distinct a and b, define:
aPb, if there exists S ∈ X including a and b such that pi(a|S) > pi(a|S − b).
By Lemma 1, if aPb then a is revealed to be preferred to b. In other words, this condition is
sufficient to reveal preference. In addition, since the underlying preference is transitive, we also
conclude that she prefers a to c if aPb and bPc for some b, even when aPc is not directly revealed
from her choices. Therefore, the transitive closure of P, denoted by PR, must also be part of her
revealed preference. One may wonder whether some revealed preference is overlooked by PR. The
following theorem, which is our first main result, shows that PR includes all preference information
given the observed choice probabilities, under only Assumption 1.
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Theorem 1 (Revealed Preference). Let pi be a RAM. Then a is revealed to be preferred to b if
and only if aPRb.
Proof. The “if” part follows from Lemma 1. To prove the “only if” part, we show that given any
preference  that includes PR, there exists a monotonic attention rule µ such that (, µ) represents
pi. The details of the construction can be found in the proof of Theorem 2. 
Theorem 1 establishes the empirical content of revealed preferences under monotonic attention
only. Our resulting revealed preferences could be incomplete: it may only provide coarse welfare
judgments in some cases. At one extreme, there is no preference revelation when there is no
regularity violation. This is because the decision maker’s behavior can be attributed fully to her
preference or to her inattention (i.e., never considering anything other than her actual choice). This
highlights the fact that our revealed preference definition is conservative, which guarantees no false
claims in terms of revealed preference especially when there are alternative explanations for the
same choice behavior. The following example illustrates that we might make misleading inferences
if we wrongly believe the decision maker uses a particular attention rule.
Example 3 (Avoiding Misleading Inference). We now describe a typical online customer’s search
behavior. For simplicity, there are three products a, b, and c. She prefers c over a and a over b (not
observable). She visits two different search engines: G and Y . 85 percent of her search takes place
on Engine G across three different platforms: laptop (20%), tablet (50%), and smartphone (15%).
Engine G always lists b before a and a before c. Due to screen size, Engine G lists up to three,
two, and one product information on laptops, tablets, and smartphones, respectively. The rest of
her search is on Engine Y (15%), which has a unique platform. In this engine, a is listed first, if it
is available, and clicking a’s link will provide information about both a and c. If a is not available,
b is listed first. In Engine Y, she clicks only one link. (When she uses Engine Y, her consideration
set is {a, c} when a and c are both available, {a} when a is available but not c, finally {b} when
only b and c are available.) Based on her underlying preference, above consideration set formation
leads to stochastic choice, the frequencies of which are reported in the following table:
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pi(·|S) S = {a, b, c} {a, b} {a, c} {b, c}
a 0.50 0.85 0.15
b 0.15 0.15 0.30
c 0.35 0.85 0.70
Assume that we observe the customer’s choice data without any knowledge about her underlying
search behavior. First, note that above choice data is consistent with the logit attention model
of Brady and Rehbeck (2016).3 In other words, we can apply their revealed preference result for
this choice data. Their model, then, concludes that the unique revealed preference is a  b  c,
which however is not the true one that has generated the data. Therefore, if we make a mistaken
assumption that the customer’s behavior is in line with the logit model, we will infer that c is the
worst alternative when it is the best product for our customer. y
Example 3 is an example where a specific cnsideration set formation model leads to wrong
conclusions on the revealed preferences. This example highlights the importance of knowledge
about the underlying choice procedure when we conduct welfare analysis. In other words, welfare
analysis is more delicate a task than it looks. Notice that, in the above example, monotonic
attention is satisfied as engines do not change their presentations of first page results when an
alternative outside of the first page becomes unavailable. Hence, Theorem 1 is applicable. Since
pi(a|{a, b, c}) > pi(a|{a, c}), our model correctly identifies her true preference between a and b.
However, our model is silent about the relative ranking of c. Therefore, while our revealed preference
is conservative, it does not make misleading claims.
We now illustrate that Theorem 1 could be very useful to understand the attraction effect phe-
nomena. The attraction effect introduced by Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) was the first evidence
against the regularity condition. It refers to an inferior product’s ability to increase the attrac-
tiveness of another alternative when this inferior product is added to a choice set. In a typical
attraction effect experiment, we observe pi(a|{a, b, c}) > pi(a|{a, b}). Assume that we have no infor-
mation about the alternatives other than the frequency of choices. Then, by simply using observed
3For example, letting the preference order be a  b  c and let weights be given as w{a} = 0, w{b} = 1/20,
w{c} = 7/20, w{a,b} = 17/60, w{a,c} = 21/340, w{b,c} = 1/10, w{a,b,c} = 79/510, it is easy to check that this is a
logit attention representation of the choice data given above.
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choice, Theorem 1 informs us that the third product c is indeed an inferior alternative compared
to a (a  c). This is exactly how these alternatives are chosen in these experiments. While alter-
natives a and b are not comparable, alternative c, which is also not comparable to b, is dominated
by a. Theorem 1 informs us about the nature of products by just observing choice frequencies.
Our revealed preference result includes the one in Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012) for
attention filters (i.e., non-random monotonic attention rules). In their model, a is revealed to be
preferred to b if there is a choice problem such that a is chosen and b is available, but it is no longer
chosen when b is removed from the choice problem. This means we have 1 = pi(a|S) > pi(a|S−b) = 0.
Given Theorem 1, this reveals that a is better than b. On the other hand, generalizing this result to
non-deterministic attention rules allows for a broader class of empirical and theoretical settings to
be analyzed, hence our revealed preference result (Theorem 1) is strictly richer than those obtained
in previous work. For example, in a deterministic world with three alternatives, there is no data
revealing the entire preference. On the other hand, we illustrate that it is possible to reveal the
entire preference in RAM with only three alternatives. This discussion makes clear the connection
between deterministic and probabilistic choice in terms of revealed preference.
Example 4 (Full Revelation). Consider the following stochastic choice with three alternatives:
pi(·|S) S = {a, b, c} {a, b} {a, c} {b, c}
a λ 1− λb λa
b 1− λ λb 1− λc
c 0 1− λa λc
If 1 − λb > λ > λa, λc, then we can verify that pi has a random attention representation (see
Theorem 2). Now we show that in all possible representations of pi, a  b  c must hold. By
Lemma 1, pi(a|{a, b, c}) > pi(a|{a, c}) implies that a is revealed to be preferred to b. Similarly,
pi(b|{a, b, c}) > pi(b|{a, b}) implies that b is revealed to be preferred to c. Hence preference is
uniquely identified. y
Example 4 also illustrates that one can achieve unique identification of preferences by utilizing
Assumption 1 even when observed choices cannot be explained by well known random attention
models such as the logit attention model of Brady and Rehbeck (2016) and the independent atten-
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tion model of Manzini and Mariotti (2014). To see this point, assume that max{1 − λa, λc} > 0.
One can show that neither Brady and Rehbeck (2016) nor Manzini and Mariotti (2014) can explain
observed choices in this example. First, notice that since both models satisfy Assumption 1 and
the preference is uniquely revealed as a  b  c under Assumption 1, if the observed choice data
can be explained by either model, then their revealed preference must also be a  b  c. That is
c must be the worst alternative. On the other hand, c is chosen with zero probability in {a, b, c}.
These models then imply that c must also be chosen with zero probability in {a, c} and {b, c}. This
contradicts our assumption that max{1− λa, λc} > 0.
3.2 A Characterization
Theorem 1 characterizes the revealed preference in our model. However, it is not applicable unless
the observed choice behavior has a random attention representation, which motivates the following
question: how can we test whether a choice rule is consistent with RAM? It turns out that RAM can
be simply characterized by only one behavioral postulate of choice: acyclicity. Our characterization
is based on an idea similar to Houthakker (1950). Choices reveal information about preferences.
If these revelations are consistent in the sense that there is no cyclical preference revelation, the
choice behavior has a RAM representation.
Theorem 2 (Characterization). A choice rule pi has a random attention representation if and only
if P has no cycle.
Recall that Example 2 is outside of our model. Theorem 2 implies that PR must have a cycle.
Indeed, we have aPb due to the regularity violation pi(a|{a, b, c}) = λa > 0 = pi(a|{a, c}). Similarly,
we have bPc by pi(b|{a, b, c}) = λb > 0 = pi(b|{a, b})) and cPa by (pi(c|{a, b, c}) = λc > 0 =
pi(c|{b, c})). Since P has a cycle, Example 2 must be outside of our model. Therefore, Theorem 2
provides a very simple test of RAM.
Our characterization result also helps us to understand the relation between our model and
random utility models. It is well-known in the literature that any choice rule that has a random
utility model representation satisfies regularity. On the other hand, for any choice rule that satisfies
regularity, P will trivially have no cycle. Hence, any choice rule that has a random utility model
representation also has a RAM representation. However, in terms of modeling purposes, RAM
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assumes random attention with a deterministic preference whereas random utility model assumes
random preference and deterministic (full) attention.
Before closing this section, we sketch the proof of Theorem 2, and provide a corollary which will
be used in the next section for developing econometric methods. The “only if” part of Theorem
2 follows directly from Lemma 1. For the “if” part, we need to construct a preference and a
monotonic attention rule representing the choice rule. Given that P has no cycle, there exists a
preference relation  including PR. Indeed, we illustrate that any such completion of PR represents
pi by an appropriately chosen µ. The construction of µ depends on a particular completion of PR,
and is not unique in general. We then illustrate that the constructed µ satisfies Assumption 1. At
the last step, we show that (, µ) represents pi. In Corollary 1, we provide one specific construction
of the attention rule. We first make a definition.
Definition 5 (Lower Contour Set; Triangular Attention Rule). Given a preference ordering  of
the alternatives in X: a1,  a2,  · · ·  aK,, a lower contour set is defined as Lk, = {aj, :
j ≥ k} = {a ∈ X : a  ak,}. A triangular attention rule is an attention rule which puts weights
only on lower contour sets. That is, µ(T |S) > 0 implies T = Lk,∩S for some k such that ak, ∈ S.
Corollary 1 (Monotonic Triangular Attention Rule Representation). Assume (, µ) is a repre-
sentation of pi with µ satisfying Assumption 1. Then there is a unique triangular attention rule µ˜
corresponding to , which also satisfies Assumption 1, such that (, µ˜) is a representation of pi.
4 Econometric Methods
Theorem 1 shows that if the choice probability pi is a RAM then preference revelation is possible.
Theorem 2 gives a falsification result, based on which a specification test can be designed. The
challenge for econometric implementation, however, is that our main assumption, monotonic atten-
tion, is imposed on the attention rule, and that the attention rule is not identified from a typical
choice data and has a much higher dimension than the identified (consistently estimable) choice
rule. To circumvent this difficulty, we rely on Corollary 1, which states that if pi has a random
attention representation (, µ), then there exists a unique monotonic triangular attention rule µ˜
such that (, µ˜) is also a representation of pi. This latter result turns out to be useful for our
proposed identification, estimation, and inference methods, as it allows us to construct, for each
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given preference ordering, a mapping from the identified choice rule to a triangular attention rule,
for which we can test whether Assumption 1 holds. This test turns out to be a test on moment
inequalities.
4.1 Nonparametric Identification
We first define the set of partially identified preferences, which mirrors Definition 3, with the only
difference that now we fix the choice rule to be identified/estimated from data. More precisely, let
pi be the underlying choice rule/data generating process. Then a preference  is compatible with
pi, denoted by  ∈ Θpi,4 if there exists some monotonic attention rule µ such that (pi,, µ) is a
RAM.
When pi is known, it is possible to employ Theorem 1 directly to construct Θpi. For example,
consider the specific preference ordering a  b, which can be checked by the following procedure.
First, check whether pi(b|S) ≤ pi(b|S− a) is violated for some S. If so, then we know the preference
ordering is not compatible with RAM and hence does not belong to Θpi (Lemma 1). On the
other hand, if the preference ordering is not rejected in the first step, we need to check along
“longer chains” (Theorem 1). That is, whether pi(b|S) ≤ pi(b|S − c) and pi(c|T ) ≤ pi(c|T − a)
are simultaneously violated for some S, T and c. If so, the preference ordering is rejected (i.e.,
incompatible with RAM), while if not then a chain of length three needs to be considered. This
process goes on for longer chains until either at some step we are able to reject the preference
ordering, or all possibilities are exhausted. In practice, additional comparisons are needed since
it is rarely the case that only a specific pair of alternatives is of interest. This algorithm, albeit
feasible, can be hard to implement in practice, even when the choice probabilities are known. The
fact that pi has to be estimated makes the problem even more complicated, since it becomes a
sequential multiple hypothesis testing problem.
Another possibility is to employ the J-test approach, which stems from the idea that, given
the choice rule, compatibility of a preference is equivalent to the existence of an attention rule
satisfying monotonicity. To implement the J-test, one fixes the choice rule (identified/estimated
4Θpi is not the same as PR (defined in Section 3.1): PR contains all revealed preferences, while Θpi is the set of
preferences compatible with the choice probability (i.e., all possible completions of PR). For example, when there is
no preference revelation, Θpi contains all preference orderings, and PR will be empty. For the other extreme that the
choice probability is not compatible with our RAM, Θpi will be empty and PR will involve cycles.
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from the data) and the preference ordering (the null hypothesis to be tested), and search the space
of all monotonic attention rules and check if Definition 3 applies. The J-test procedure can be quite
computationally demanding, due to the fact that the space of attention rules has high dimension.
We further discuss the J-test approach in Section SA.4.3 of the Supplemental Appendix and how
it is related to our proposed procedure.
One of the main purposes of this section is to provide an equivalent form of identification, which
(i) is simple to implement, and (ii) remains statistically valid even when applied using estimated
choice rules. For ease of exposition, we rewrite the choice rule pi as a long vector pi, whose elements
are simply the probability of each alternative a ∈ X being chosen from a choice problem S ∈ X .
For example, one can label the choice problems as S1, S2, · · · , the alternatives as a1, a2, · · · , aK ,
and then the vector pi simply consists of pi(a1|S1), pi(a2|S1), · · · , pi(aK |S1), pi(a1|S2), pi(a2|S2), etc.
See Example 5 for a concrete illustration.
Theorem 3 (Nonparametric Identification). Given any preference , there exists a unique matrix
R such that ∈ Θpi if and only if Rpi ≤ 0.
Proof. Recall that (pi,) has a RAM representation if and only if there exists a monotonic and
triangular attention rule µ such that pi is induced by µ and  (Corollary 1). With this fact, we
are able to construct the constraint matrix R explicitly, and write it as a product, RC. The
first matrix, R, consists of constraints on the attention rules, and the second matrix, C, maps
the choice rule back to a triangular attention rule.
First consider R. The only restrictions imposed on attention rules are from the monotonicity
assumption (Assumption 1). Again, we represent a generic attention rule µ as a long vector µ.
Then each row of R will consist of one “+1”, one “−1” and 0 otherwise. The product Rµ then
corresponds to µ(T |S)− µ(T |S − a), for all S, T ⊂ S, and a ∈ S − T . That is, we use Rµ ≤ 0 to
represent Assumption 1. Note that R does not depend on any preference.
Next consider C. Given some preference  and the choice rule pi, the only possible triangular
attention rule that can be constructed is (see Corollary 1 and the proof of Theorem 2 in the
Appendix)
µ(T |S) =
∑
k: ak,∈S
1(T = S ∩ Lk,) · pi(ak,|S),
where {Lk, : 1 ≤ k ≤ K} are the lower contour sets corresponding to the preference ordering 
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(Definition 5). The above defines the mapping C, and represents the triangular attention rule as a
linear combination of the choice probabilities. This mapping depends on the preference/hypothesis
because the triangular attention rule depends on the preference/hypothesis.
Along the construction, both R and C are unique, hence showing R is uniquely determined
by the preference . 
This theorem states that in order to decide whether a preference  is compatible with the
(identifiable) choice rule pi, it suffices to check a collection of inequality constraints. In particular,
it is no longer necessary to consider the sequential and multiple testing problems mentioned earlier,
or numerically searching in the high dimensional space of attention rules. Moreover, as we discuss
below, given the large econometric literature on moment inequality testing, many techniques can
be adapted when Theorem 3 is applied to estimated choice rules. An algorithmic construction of
the constraint matrix R is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Construction of R.
Require: Set a preference .
R ← empty matrix
for S in X do
for a in S do
for b ≺ a in S do
R ← add row corresponding to pi(b|S)− pi(b|S − a) ≤ 0.
end for
end for
end for
As can be seen, the only input needed is the preference , which we are interested in testing
against. Each row of R consists of one “+1”, one “−1”, and 0 otherwise. The constraint matrix
R is non-random and does not depend on the estimated choice probabilities, but rather determined
by the collection of (fixed, known to the researcher) restrictions on the estimable choice probabilities.
Next we compute the number of constraints (i.e. rows) in R for the complete data case (i.e., when
all choice problems are observed):
#row(R) =
∑
S∈X
∑
a,b∈S
1(b ≺ a) =
∑
S∈X , |S|≥2
(|S|
2
)
=
K∑
k=2
(
K
k
)(
k
2
)
,
where K = |X| is the number of alternatives in the grand set X. Not surprisingly, the number of
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constraints increases very fast with the size of the grand set. However, once the matrix R has
been constructed for one preference , the constraint matrices for other preference orderings can
be obtained by column permutations of R. This is particular useful and saves computation if
there are multiple hypotheses to be tested, as the above algorithm only needs to be implemented
once.
Finally, we illustrate that, in simple examples, the constraint matrix R can be constructed
intuitively.
Example 5 (R with Three Alternatives). Assume there are three alternatives, a, b and c in X,
then the choice rule is represented by a vector in R9:
pi =
[
pi(·|{a, b, c})︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈R3
, pi(·|{a, b})︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈R2
, pi(·|{a, c})︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈R2
, pi(·|{b, c})︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈R2
]′
,
where for ease of presentation trivial cases such as pi(a|{b, c}) = 0 and pi(b|{b}) = 1 are ignored.
Now consider the preference/hypothesis b  a  c. From Lemma 1, we can reject b  a if
pi(a|{a, b, c}) > pi(a|{a, c}). Therefore, we need the reverse inequality in Rbac, given by a row:
[
1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
]
.
Similarly, we will be able to reject a  c if pi(c|{a, b, c}) > pi(c|{b, c}), which implies the following
row in the matrix Rbac: [
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1
]
.
The row corresponding to b  c is
[
0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0
]
.
Therefore, for this simple problem with three alternatives, we have the following constraint matrix:
Rbac =

1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0
 .
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Note that for problems with more than three alternatives, the above reasoning does not work
if implemented na¨ıvely. Consider the case X = {a, b, c, d}. Then b  a can be rejected by
pi(a|{a, b, c, d}) > pi(a|{a, c, d}), pi(a|{a, b, d}) > pi(a|{a, d}) or pi(a|{a, b, c}) > pi(a|{a, c}), which
correspond to three rows in the constraint matrix.
Again we emphasize that, to construct R, one does not need to know the numerical value of the
choice rule pi. The matrix R contains restrictions jointly imposed by the monotonicity assumption
and the preference  that is to be tested. y
4.2 Hypothesis Testing
Given the identification result in Theorem 3, we can replace the identifiable choice rule with its
estimate to conduct estimation and inference of the (partially identifiable) preferences. We can also
conduct specification testing by evaluating whether the identified set Θpi is empty. To proceed, we
assume the following data structure.
Assumption 2 (DGP). The data is a random sample of choice problems Yi and corresponding
choices yi, {(yi, Yi) : yi ∈ Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, generated by the underlying choice rule P[yi = a|Yi =
S] = pi(a|S), with P[Yi = S] ≥ p > 0 for all S ∈ X .
We only assume the data is generated from some choice rule pi. We allow for the possibility that
it is not a RAM, since our identification result permits falsifying the RAM representation: pi has
a RAM representation if and only if Θpi is not empty according to Theorem 3. In addition, we
only assume that the choice problem Yi and the corresponding selection yi ∈ Yi are observed for
each unit, while the underlying (possibly random) consideration set for the decision maker remains
unobserved (i.e., the set T in Definition 2 and Figure 1). For simplicity, we discuss the case of
“complete data” where all choice problems are potentially observable, but in Section SA.3 and
SA.4.4 of the Supplemental Appendix we extend our work to the case of incomplete data.
The estimated choice rule is denoted by pˆi,
pˆi(a|S) =
∑
1≤i≤N 1(yi = a, Yi = S)∑
1≤i≤N 1(Yi = S)
, a ∈ S, S ∈ X .
For convenience, we represent pˆi(·|S) by the vector pˆiS , and its population counterpart by piS . The
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choice rules are stacked into a long vector, denoted by pˆi with the population counterpart pi.
We consider Studentized test statistics, and hence we introduce some additional notation. Let
σpi, be the standard deviation of Rpˆi, and σˆ be its plug-in estimate. That is,
σpi, =
√
diag
(
RΩpiR′
)
and σˆ =
√
diag
(
RΩˆR′
)
,
where diag(·) denotes the operator that extracts the diagonal elements of a square matrix, or
constructs a diagonal matrix when applied to a vector. Here Ωpi is block diagonal, with blocks
given by 1P[Yi=S]Ωpi,S , and Ωpi,S = diag(piS) − piSpi′S . The estimator Ωˆ is simply constructed by
plugging in the estimated choice rule.
Consider the null hypothesis H0 : ∈ Θpi. This null hypothesis is useful if the researcher believes
a certain preference represents the underlying data generating process. It also serves as the basis for
constructing confidence sets or for ranking preferences according to their (im)plausibility in repeated
sampling (for example, via employing associated p-values). Given a specific preference, the test
statistic is constructed as the maximum of the Studentized, restricted sample choice probabilities:
T () =
√
N ·max
{
(Rpˆi) σˆ, 0
}
,
where  denotes elementwise division (i.e, Hadamard division) for conformable matrices. The test
statistic is the largest element of the vector
√
N(Rpˆi)  σˆ if it is positive, or zero otherwise.
The reasoning behind such construction is straightforward: if the preference is compatible with the
underlying choice rule, then in the population we have Rpi ≤ 0, meaning that the test statistic,
T (), should not be “too large.”
Other test statistics have been proposed for testing moment inequalities, and usually the spe-
cific choice depends on the context. When many moment inequalities can be potentially violated
simultaneously, it is usually preferred to use a statistic based on truncated Euclidean norm. In our
problem, however, we expect only a few moment inequalities to be violated, and therefore we prefer
to employ T (). Having said this, the large sample approximation results given in Theorem 4
can be adapted to handle other test statistics commonly encountered in the literature on moment
inequalities.
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The null hypothesis is rejected whenever the test statistic is “too large,” or more precisely, when
it exceeds a critical value, which is chosen to guarantee uniform size control in large samples. We
describe how this critical value leading to uniformly valid testing procedures is constructed based
on simulating from multivariate normal distributions. Our construction employs the Generalized
Moment Selection (GMS) approach of Andrews and Soares (2010); see also Canay (2010) and Bugni
(2016) for closely related methods. The literature on moment inequalities testing includes several
alternative approaches, some of which we discuss briefly in Section SA.4.5 of the Supplemental
Appendix.
To illustrate the intuition behind the construction, first rewrite the test statistic T () as the
following:
T () = max
{(
R
√
N(pˆi − pi) +
√
NRpi
) σˆ, 0}.
By the central limit theorem, the first component
√
N(pˆi − pi) is approximately distributed as
N (0, Ωpi). The second component, Rpi, although unknown, is bounded above by zero under the
null hypothesis. Motivated by these observations, we approximate the distribution of T () by
simulation as follows:
T ?() =
√
N ·max
{
(Rz?) σˆ + ψN (Rpˆi, σˆ), 0
}
.
Here z? is a random vector simulated from the distribution N (0, Ωˆ/N), and √NψN (Rpˆi, σˆ)
is used to replace the unknown moment conditions (
√
NRpi)  σˆ. Several choices of ψN have
been proposed. One extreme choice is ψN (·) = 0, so that the upper bound 0 is used to replace
the unknown Rpi. Such a choice also delivers uniformly valid inference in large samples, and is
usually referred to as “critical value based on the least favorable model.” However, for practical
purposes it is better to be less conservative. In our implementation we employ
ψN (Rpˆi, σˆ) =
1
κN
(
Rpˆi  σˆ
)
−
,
where (a)− = a  1(a ≤ 0), with  denoting the Hadamard product, the indicator function 1(·)
operating element-wise on the vector a, and κN diverges slowly. That is, the function ψN (·) retains
the non-positive elements of (Rpˆiσˆ)/κN , since under the null hypothesis all moment conditions
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are non-positive. We use κN =
√
lnN , which turns out to work well in the simulations described
in Section 6. For other choices of ψN (·), see Andrews and Soares (2010).
In practice, M simulations are conducted to obtain the simulated statistics {T ?m() : 1 ≤ m ≤
M}. Then, given some α ∈ (0, 1), the critical value is constructed as
cα() = inf
{
t :
1
M
M∑
m=1
1
(
T ?m() ≤ t
) ≥ 1− α},
and the null hypothesis H0 : ∈ Θpi is rejected if and only if T () > cα(). Alternatively, one
can compute the p-value as
pVal() = 1
M
M∑
m=1
1
(
T ?m() > T ()
)
.
To justify the proposed critical values, it is important to address uniformity issues. A testing
procedure is (asymptotically) uniform among a class of data generating processes, if the asymptotic
size does not exceed the nominal level across this class. Testing procedures that are valid only
pointwise but not uniformly may yield bad approximations to the finite sample distribution, because
in finite samples the moment inequalities could be close to binding. The following theorem shows
that conducting inference using the critical values above is uniformly valid.
Theorem 4 (Uniformly Valid Testing). Assume Assumption 2 holds. Let Π be a class of choice
rules, and  a preference, such that: (i) for each pi ∈ Π, ∈ Θpi; and (ii) infpi∈Π min(σpi,) > 0.
Then,
lim sup
N→∞
sup
pi∈Π
P [T () > cα()] ≤ α.
The proof is postponed to Appendix A.2. The only requirement is that each moment condition is
nondegenerate so that the normalized statistics are well-defined in large samples, but no restrictions
on correlations among moment conditions are imposed.
4.3 Extensions and Discussion
We discuss some extensions based on Theorem 4, including how to construct uniformly valid confi-
dence sets via test inversion, and how to conduct uniformly valid specification testing, both based
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on testing individual preferences.
Confidence Set
Given the uniformly valid hypothesis testing procedure already developed in Theorem 4, we can
obtain a uniformly valid confidence set for the (partially) identified preferences by test inversion:
C (α) =
{
 : T () ≤ cα()
}
.
The resulting confidence set C (α) exhibits an asymptotic uniform coverage rate of at least 1− α:
lim inf
N→∞
inf
pi∈Π
min
∈Θpi
P
[ ∈ C (α)] ≥ 1− α.
This inference method offers a uniformly valid confidence set for each member of the partially
identified set with pre-specified coverage probability, which is a popular approach in the partial
identification literature (Imbens and Manski, 2004).
Testing Model Compatibility: H0 : P ∩Θpi 6= ∅
Given a collection of preferences, an empirically relevant question is whether any of them is compat-
ible with the data generating process—a basic model specification question. That is, the question
is whether the null hypothesis H0 : P∩Θpi 6= ∅ should be rejected. If the null hypothesis is rejected,
then certain features shared by the collection of preferences is incompatible with the underlying
decision theory (up to Type I error). See Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2015), Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye
(2019) and references therein for further discussion of this idea and related methods.
For a concrete example, consider the question that whether a  b is compatible with the data
generating process. As long as there are more than 2 alternatives in the grand set, a question like
this can be accommodated by setting P = {: a  b}. Rejection of this null hypothesis provides
evidence in favor of b being preferred to a, (up to Type I error). Of course with more preferences
included in the collection, it becomes more difficult to reject the null hypothesis.
The test is based on whether the confidence set intersects with P:
H0 is rejected if and only if C (α) ∩ P = ∅.
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We note that, since C (α) covers elements in the identified set asymptotically and uniformly with
probability 1−α, the above testing procedure will have uniform size control. Indeed, if P∩Θpi 6= ∅,
there exists some ∈ P ∩ Θpi, which will be included in C (α) with at least 1 − α probability
asymptotically.
One important application of this idea is to set P as the collection of all possible preferences,
which leads to a specification testing. Then, the null hypothesis becomes H0 : Θpi 6= ∅, and is
rejected based on the following rule:
H0 is rejected if and only if C (α) = ∅.
Rejection in this case implies that at least one of the underlying assumptions is violated, and the
data generating process cannot be represented by a RAM (up to Type I error).
5 Incorporating Additional Restrictions
Our identification and inference results so far are obtained using RAM only, that is, all empiri-
cal content of our revealed preference theory comes from the weak nonparametric Assumption 1.
As mentioned before, our model provides a minimum benchmark for preference revelation, which
sometimes may not deliver enough empirical content. However, it is easy to incorporate additional
(nonparametric) assumptions in specific settings. In this section, we first illustrate one such possi-
bility, where additional restrictions on the attentional rule are imposed for binary choice problems.
This will improve our identification and inference results considerably. We then consider random
attention filters, which are one of the motivating examples of monotonic attention rules, and show
that in this case there is no identification improvement relative to the baseline RAM.
5.1 Attentive at Binaries
To motivate our approach, a policy maker may want to conclude that a is revealed to be preferred to
b if the decision maker chooses a over b “frequently enough” in binary choice problems. “Frequently
enough” is measured by a constant φ ≥ 1/2.5 For example, when φ = 2/3, it means that choosing
5Even when the policy maker is least cautious, we need pi(a|{a, b}) > pi(b|{a, b}) to conclude a is strictly better
than b. This implies pi(a|{a, b}) > 1/2. Hence φ must be greater than 1/2.
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a twice more often than choosing b implies a is better than b. φ represents how cautious the policy
maker is. Denote by
aPφb if and only if pi(a|{a, b}) > φ.
To justify Pφ as preference revelation, the policy maker inherently assumes that the decision maker
pays attention to the entire set “frequently enough.” This is captured by the following assumption
on the attention rule.
Assumption 3 (φ-Attentive at Binaries). For all a, b ∈ X and φ ≥ 1/2,
µ({a, b}|{a, b}) ≥ 1− φ
φ
max
{
µ({a}|{a, b}) , µ({b}|{a, b})
}
.
The quantity 1−φφ is a measure of full attention at binaries. When
1−φ
φ = 0 (or φ = 1), there
is no constraint on µ({a, b}|{a, b}). In this case, it is possible that the decision maker only con-
siders singleton consideration sets. When 1−φφ gets larger (or φ gets smaller), the probability of
being fully attentive is strictly positive, which creates room for preference revelation. An alterna-
tive way to understand Assumption 3 is as follows. Take φ = max{pi(a|{a, b}), pi(b|{a, b})}, then
1−φ
φ max{µ({a}|{a, b}) , µ({b}|{a, b})} is a strict lower bound on the amount of attention that the
decision maker has to pay to both options, for revelation to occur.
We now illustrate that, under Assumption 3, if pi(a|{a, b}) > φ then a is revealed to be preferred
to b. Let (, µ) be a RAM representation of pi where µ satisfies Assumption 3. First, Assumption 3
necessitates that µ({a}|{a, b}) cannot be higher than φ. (To see this, assume µ({a}|{a, b}) > φ. By
Assumption 3, we must have µ({a, b}|{a, b}) > 1−φ, which is a contradiction.) Then, pi(a|{a, b}) >
φ indicates that a is chosen over b whenever the decision maker pays attention to {a, b} (revealed
preference). Therefore, a  b.
Example 6 (Preference Revelation Without Regularity Violation). To illustrate the extra iden-
tification power of Assumption 3, consider the following stochastic choice with three alternatives
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and take φ = 1/2.
pi(·|S) S = {a, b, c} {a, b} {a, c} {b, c}
a 1/3 2/3 1/2
b 1/3 1/3 2/3
c 1/3 1/2 1/3
Note that pi satisfies the regularity condition, meaning that there is no preference revelation if only
monotonicity (Assumption 1) is imposed on the attention rule. That is, P = PR = ∅ (Section
3.1). On the other hand, by utilizing Assumption 3, we can infer the preference completely. Since
pi(a|{a, b}) > 1/2 and pi(b|{b, c}) > 1/2, we must have aPφb and bPφc. Notice that pi(a|{a, c}) = 1/2,
hence we cannot directly deduce aPφc. Since the underlying preference is transitive, we can conclude
that the decision maker prefers a to c as aPφb and bPφc, even when aPφc is not directly revealed
from her choices. Therefore, the transitive closure of Pφ, denoted by PφR , must also be part of the
revealed preference. In this example, note that the same conclusion can be drawn as long as the
policy maker assumes φ < 2/3. y
To accommodate the revealed preference defined in the original model (i.e., to combine Assump-
tion 1 and 3), we now define the following binary relation:
a(Pφ ∪ P)b if and only if
either (i) for some S ∈ S, pi(a|S) > pi(a|S − b), or (ii) pi(a|{a, b}) > φ.
Pφ ∪ P includes our original binary relation P, defined under the monotonic attention restriction
(Assumption 1), as well as Pφ, characterized by the new attentive at binary assumption. Therefore,
we can infer more.
The next theorem shows that acyclicity of Pφ ∪ P, or its transitive closure (Pφ ∪ P)R, provides a
simple characterization of the model we consider in this subsection.
Theorem 5 (Characterization). For a given φ ≥ 1/2, a choice rule pi has a random attention
representation (, µ) where µ satisfies Assumption 1 and 3 if and only if Pφ ∪ P has no cycle.
For φ < 1, the model characterized by Theorem 5 has a higher predictive power (i.e., empirical
content) compared to the model characterized by Theorem 2. Hence the model will fail to retain
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some of its explanatory power. For example, Example 4 with λa, λb, λc < 1 − φ is outside of the
model given here.
Under the assumption φ = 1/2 and pi(a|{a, b}) 6= 1/2 for all a, b, Theorem 5 yields that our
framework reveals a unique preference while it allows regularity violation.
Remark 1 (Acyclic Stochastic Transitivity). We would like to highlight a close connection between
acyclicity of Pφ ∪ P and the acyclic stochastic transitivity (AST) introduced by Fishburn (1973).
The model characterized by Theorem 5 satisfies a weaker version of AST:
pi(a1|{a1, a2}) > φ, · · · , pi(ak−1|{ak−1, ak}) > φ imply pi(a1|{a1, ak}) ≤ φ.
We call this condition φ-acyclic stochastic transitivity (φ-AST). Note that 12 -AST is equivalent to
AST. If we only consider binary choice probabilities, acyclicity of Pφ ∪ P becomes equivalent to
φ-AST. Otherwise, our condition is stronger than φ-AST. y
Now we discuss the econometric implementation. Recall from Section 4 that, to test if a specific
preference ordering is compatible with the observed (identifiable) choice rule and the monotonicity
assumption, we first construct a triangular attention rule and then test whether the triangular
attention rule satisfies Assumption 1. This is formally justified in the proof of Theorem 3.
This line of reasoning can be naturally extended to accommodate Assumption 3 in our econo-
metric implementation. Again, the researcher constructs a triangular attention rule based on a
specific preference ordering and the identifiable choice rule. She then tests whether the triangular
attention rule satisfies Assumption 1 and 3. This is formally justified in the proof of Theorem 5.
For testing, only minor changes have to be made when constructing the matrix R. The precise
construction is given in Algorithm 2.
We now revisit Example 5 to illustrate what additional (identifying) restrictions are imposed by
Assumption 3.
Example 7 (Example 5, Continued). Recall that there are three alternatives, a, b and c in X,
and the choice rule is represented by a vector in R9. For the preference b  a  c, the matrix
Rbac contains three restrictions if only Assumption 1 is imposed. With our new restriction on
32
Algorithm 2 Construction of R.
Require: Set a preference .
R ← empty matrix
for S in X do
for a in S do
for b ≺ a in S do
R ← add row corresponding to pi(b|S)− pi(b|S − a) ≤ 0.
end for
end for
if S = {a, b} is binary and b ≺ a then
R ← add row corresponding to 1−φφ pi(b|S)− pi(a|S) ≤ 0
end if
end for
the attention rule for binary choice problems, Rbac is further augmented:
Rbac =

1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 1−φφ −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 1−φφ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1−φφ

,
where the first three rows corresponding to restrictions imposed by Assumption 1, and the last
three rows captures our new Assumption 3. y
Assumption 3 improves considerably the empirical content of our benchmark RAM (Assumption
1). However, this assumption is just one of many possible assumptions that could be used in
addition to our general RAM. The main takeaway is that our proposed RAM offers a baseline
for specific, empirically relevant models of choice under random limited attention. In Section 6
we compare using simulations the empirical content of our benchmark RAM, which employs only
Assumption 1, and the model that incorporates Assumption 3 as well.
5.2 Random Attention Filter
We now consider random attention filters, which are one of the motivating examples of monotonic
attention rules. Recall from Section 2.1 that an attention filter is a deterministic attention rule
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that satisfies Assumption 1, and a random attention filter is a convex combination of attention
filters, and hence a random attention filter will also satisfy Assumption 1. For example, the same
individual might be utilizing different platforms during her Internet search. Each platform yields
a different attention filter, and the usage frequency of each platform is equal to the weight of that
attention filter. Random attention filters also give a different interpretation of our model.
The set of all random attention filters is a strict subset of monotonic attention rules. This is
not surprising given that the class of monotonic attention rules is very large. What is (arguably)
surprising is the following fact that we are able to show: if (pi,, µ) is a RAM with µ being a
monotonic attention rule, there exists a random attention filter µ′ such that (pi,, µ′) is still a
RAM (see Remark 2). Before presenting this result, however, we observe that µ and µ′ need not
be the same, which means that there are monotonic attention rules that cannot be written as a
convex combination of attention filters.
Example 8. Let X = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Consider a monotonic attention rule µ such that (i) µ(T |S)
is either 0 or 0.5, (ii) µ(T |S) = 0 if |T | > 1, and (iii) if µ({aj}|S) = 0 and k < j then µ({ak}|S) = 0.
Then we must have µ({a3}|{a1, a2, a3, a4}) = µ({a4}|{a1, a2, a3, a4}) = 0.5. We now show that µ
is not a random attention filter.
Suppose µ can be written as a linear combination of attention filters. Then µ({a3}|{a1, a2, a3, a4}) =
µ({a4}|{a1, a2, a3, a4}) = 0.5 implies that only attention filters for which Γ({a1, a2, a3, a4}) =
{a3} or Γ({a1, a2, a3, a4}) = {a4} must be assigned positive probability. On the other hand,
µ({a2}|{a1, a2, a3}) = 0.5 and µ({a2}|{a1, a2, a4}) = 0.5 imply that for all Γ which are assigned
positive probability Γ({a1, a2, a3}) = {a2} whenever Γ({a1, a2, a3, a4}) = {a4} and Γ({a1, a2, a4}) =
{a2} whenever Γ({a1, a2, a3, a4}) = {a3}. To see this, notice that the attention filter property im-
plies Γ({a1, a2, a3}) = {a3} for all Γ with Γ({a1, a2, a3, a4}) = {a3} and Γ({a1, a2, a4}) = {a4} for
all Γ with Γ({a1, a2, a3, a4}) = {a4}. But then it must be the case that Γ({a1, a2}) = {a2} for all
Γ which are assigned positive probability, or that µ({a2}|{a1, a2}) = 1, a contradiction. y
We now show that if we restrict our attention to a certain type of monotonic attention rules, then
we can show that within that class every attention rule is a random attention filter (i.e., convex
combination of deterministic attention filters). Let MT () denote the set of all attention rules
that are both monotonic (Assumption 1) and triangular with respect to  (Definition 5 in the
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Appendix), and let AF() denote all attention filters that are triangular with respect to . We
are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 6 (Random Attention Filter). For any µ ∈MT (), there exists a probability law ψ on
AF() such that for any S ∈ X and T ⊂ S
µ(T |S) =
∑
Γ∈AF()
1(Γ(S) = T ) · ψ(Γ).
Remark 2 (Triangular Random Attention Filter Representation). Combining this theorem and
Corollary 1 in the Appendix, we easily reach the following conclusion: If pi has a random attention
representation (, µ), then there exists a triangular random attention filter µ′ such that (, µ′) also
represents pi. y
The proof of Theorem 6 is long and hence left to Appendix, but here we provide a sketch of
it. First, MT () is a compact and convex set, and thus the above theorem can alternatively be
stated as follows: The set of extreme points ofMT () is AF(). (An attention rule µ ∈MT ()
is an extreme point of MT () if it cannot be written as a nondegenerate convex combination of
any µ′, µ′′ ∈ MT ().) Then, Minkowski’s Theorem guarantees that every element of MT () lies
in the convex hull of AF().
Obviously, every element of AF() is an extreme point of MT (). We then show that non-
deterministic triangular attention rules cannot be extreme points, i.e. given any µ ∈ MT () −
AF() we can construct µ′, µ′′ ∈ MT () such that µ = 12µ′ + 12µ′′. The key step is to show
that both µ′ and µ′′ that we construct are monotonic. After this step, we have shown that no
µ ∈MT ()−AF() can be an extreme point, thus concluding the proof.
6 Simulation Evidence
This section gives a summary of a simulation study conducted to assess the finite sample properties
of our proposed econometric methods. We consider a class of logit attention rules indexed by ς:
µς(T |S) = wT,ς∑
T ′⊂S wT ′,ς
, wT,ς = |T |ς ,
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where |T | is the cardinality of T . Thus the decision maker pays more attention to larger sets if
ς > 0, and pays more attention to smaller sets if ς < 0. When ς is very small (negative and large
in absolute magnitude), the decision maker almost always pays attention to singleton sets, hence
nothing will be learned about the underlying preference from the choice data.
Other details on the data generating process used in the simulation study are as follows. First,
the grand set X consists of five alternatives, a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5. Without loss of generality,
assume the underlying preference is a1  a2  a3  a4  a5. Second, the data consists of choice
problems of size two, three, four and five. That is, there are in total 26 choice problems. Third,
given a specific realization of Yi, a consideration set is generated from the logit attention model with
ς = 2, after which the choice yi is determined by the aforementioned preference. We also report
simulation evidence for ς ∈ {0, 1} in the Supplemental Appendix. Finally, the observed data is a
random sample {(yi, Yi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, where the effective sample size can be 50, 100, 200, 300 and
400. (Effective sample size refers to the number of observations for each choice problem. Because
there are 26 choice problems, the overall sample size is N ∈ {1300, 2600, 5200, 7800, 10400}.)
For inference, we employ the procedure introduced in Section 4 and test whether a specific
preference ordering is compatible with the basic RAM (Assumption 1). We also incorporate the
attentive at binaries assumption introduced in Section 5.1. Recall from Assumption 3 that (1−φ)/φ
is a measure of full attention at binaries, and specifying a larger value (i.e., a smaller value of φ)
implies that the researcher is more willing to draw information from binary comparisons. Note
that with φ = 1, imposing Assumption 3 does not bring any additional identification power. Before
proceeding, we list five hypotheses (preference orderings), and whether they are compatible with
our RAM and specific values of φ.
φ
1 .95 .90 .85 .80 .75 .70 .65 .60 .55 .50
H0,1 : a1  a2  a3  a4  a5 X X X X X X X X X X X
H0,2 : a2  a3  a4  a5  a1 X X X X × × × × × × ×
H0,3 : a3  a4  a5  a2  a1 × × × × × × × × × × ×
H0,4 : a4  a5  a3  a2  a1 × × × × × × × × × × ×
H0,5 : a5  a4  a3  a2  a1 × × × × × × × × × × ×
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As can be seen, H0,1 always belongs to the identified set of preferences, as it is the preference
ordering used in the underlying data generating process. H0,2, however, may or may not belong
to the identified set depending on the value of φ: with φ close to 0.5, the researcher is confident
enough using information from binary comparisons, and she will be able to reject this hypothesis;
for φ close to 1, Assumption 3 no longer brings too much additional identification power beyond
the monotonic attention assumption, and monotonic attention alone is not strong enough to reject
this hypothesis. Indeed, with φ = 1 (i.e., Assumption 1 alone), the set of identified preference is
{: a2  a3  a4  a5}, which contains H0,2. The other three hypotheses, H0,3, H0,4 and H0,5, do
not belong to the identified set even with φ = 1.
Overall, our simulation has 5 (different N) × 5 (different preference orderings) × 11 (different φ)
= 275 designs. For each design, 5,000 simulation repetitions are used, and the five null hypotheses
are tested using our proposed method at the 5% nominal level. Simulation results are summarized
in Figure 2.
We first focus on H0,1 (panel a). As this preference ordering is compatible with our RAM, one
should expect the rejection probability to be less than the nominal level. Indeed, the rejection prob-
ability is far below 0.05: this illustrates a generic feature of any (reasonable) procedure for testing
moment inequalities—to maintain uniform asymptotic size control, empirical rejection probability
is below the nominal level when the inequalities are far from binding. Next consider H0,2 (panel b).
For φ lager than 0.85, the rejection probability is below the nominal size, which is compatible with
our theory, because this preference belongs to the identified set when only Assumption 1 is imposed.
With smaller φ, the researcher relies more heavily on information from binary comparisons/choice
problems, and she is able to reject this hypothesis much more frequently. This demonstrates how
additional restrictions on the attention rule can be easily accommodated by our basic RAM, which
in turn can bring additional identification power. The other three hypotheses (panel c, d and e) are
not compatible with our RAM, and we do see that the rejection probability is much larger than the
nominal size even for φ = 1, showing that even our basic RAM has non-trivial empirical content in
this case.
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7 Conclusion
We introduced a limited attention model allowing for a general class of monotonic (and possibly
stochastic) attention rules, which we called a Random Attention Model (RAM). We showed that
this model nests several important recent contributions in both economic theory and econometrics,
in addition to other classical results from decision theory. Using our RAM, we obtained a testable
theory of revealed preferences and developed partial identification results for the decision maker’s
unobserved strict preference ordering. Our results included a precise constructive characterization
of the identified set for preferences, as well as uniformly valid inference methods based on that
characterization. Furthermore, we showed how additional nonparametric restriction can be easily
incorporated into RAM to obtain tigher empirical implications, and more powerful accompying
econometric procedures. We found good finite sample performance of our econometric methods in
a simulation experiment. Last but not least, we provide the general-purpose R software package
ramchoice, which allows other researchers to easily employ our econometric methods in empirical
applications.
Appendix: Omitted Proofs
This appendix collects proofs that are omitted from the main text to improve the exposition.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose pi has a random attention representation (, µ). Then Lemma 1 implies that  must
include P so P must be acyclic.
For the other direction, suppose that P has no cycle. Pick any preference  that includes PR and
enumerate all alternatives with respect to : a1,  a2,  · · ·  aK,. Let {Lk, : 1 ≤ k ≤ K}
be the corresponding lower contour sets (Definition 5). Then we specify µ˜ as
µ˜(T |S) =
{
pi(ak,|S) if ak, ∈ S and T = Lk, ∩ S
0 otherwise
.
It is trivial to verify that (, µ˜) represents pi, since (, µ˜) induces the following choice rule:∑
T⊂S
1[a is -best in T ]µ˜(T |S) =
∑
ak,∈S
1[a is -best in Lk, ∩ S]µ˜(Lk, ∩ S|S)
=
∑
ak,∈S
1[a is -best in Lk, ∩ S]pi(ak,|S)
=
∑
ak,∈S
1[a = ak,]pi(ak,|S)
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= pi(a|S),
which is the same as pi. For the first equality, we use the definition that a triangular attention rule
only puts weights on lower contour sets; for the second equality, we apply the definition/construction
of µ˜; the third equality follows from the definition of lower contour sets.
Now we verify that µ˜ satisfies Assumption 1. Assume this is not the case, then it means there
exist some S, ak,, a`, ∈ S, such that (i) Lk, ∩ S = Lk, ∩ (S − a`,), and (ii) µ˜(Lk, ∩ S|S) >
µ˜(Lk, ∩ (S− a`,)|S− a`,). By the definition of lower contour sets, (i) implies a`,  ak,. Then
(ii) implies
µ˜(Lk, ∩ S|S) = pi(ak|S) > µ˜(Lk, ∩ (S − a`,)|S − a`,) = pi(ak,|S − a`,).
The above, however, implies that ak,Pa`,, which contradicts the implication of (i) that a`, 
ak,. This closes the proof.
Remark A.1. The previous proof has a nice implication that, a choice rule can be represented
by a monotonic attention rule if and only if it can also be represented by a monotonic triangular
attention rule. Formally, if pi has a random attention representation, (, µ), then (, µ˜) also
represents pi where µ˜ is monotonic and triangular with respect to . Hence, we can focus on
monotonic triangular attention rules without loss of generality. This is formally summarized in
Corollary 1. y
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
See Section SA.4.1 of the Supplemental Appendix.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
The “only if” part is trivial and is omitted. We illustrate the “if” part. Assume that Pφ ∪ P
has no cycle (or equivalently, its transitive closure (Pφ ∪ P)R has no cycle), then there exists some
preference ordering that embeds Pφ ∪P. Fix one such preference . With the same argument used
in the proof of Theorem 2, we can construct a triangular attention rule µ(T |S) and show that it
satisfies Assumption 1.
We then show that µ(T |S) satisfies Assumption 3. Take binary S = {a, b} and assume without
loss of generality that a  b. Then µ({a, b}|{a, b}) = pi(a|S) and µ({b}|{a, b}) = pi(b|S). Violation
of Assumption 3 implies pi(a|{a, b}) < 1−φφ pi(b|{a, b}), and equivalently, pi(b|{a, b}) > φ. This means
that bPφa, which violates our definition of .
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
We show that the set of extreme points of MT () is AF(). Clearly, any Γ ∈ AF() is an
extreme point. Pick a non-deterministic attention rule µ ∈MT (). We show that µ cannot be an
extreme point. Let Xµ ⊂ X stand for all sets S ∈ X for which µ(T |S) = 1 for no T ⊂ S. We start
by choosing ε > 0 small enough so that none of the non-binding constraints are affected whenever
ε is added to or subtracted from µ(T |S) for all T ⊂ S and S ∈ X . Let kµ = minS∈Xµ |S|. Since µ
is not deterministic, such kµ exists.
We begin with the following simple observation that given S with |S| = kµ we can have at most
two subsets of S with µ(T |S) ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, it must be the case that µ(S|S) ∈ (0, 1).
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Lemma A.1. Let S with |S| = kµ be given. Then there exist at most two T ⊂ S such that
µ(T |S) ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, µ(S|S) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Suppose there exist three such subsets: T1, T2, and T3. Since µ is triangular the subsets
which are considered with positive probability can be ordered by set inclusion. Hence, we can
without loss of generality assume T1 ⊂ T2 ⊂ T3. But then since µ is monotonic and T1 ⊂ T2 ⊂ S it
must be that µ(T1|T2) ∈ (0, 1) and µ(T2|T2) ∈ (0, 1). This contradicts the definition of kµ. Hence
there can be at most two subsets T1 and T2 with positive probability. The same contradiction
appears as long as T2 ( S. Hence, T2 = S. 
Now for all sets S ∈ Xµ with |S| = kµ, we define µ′ and µ′′ as follows:
µ′(T |S) = µ(T |S) + ε,
µ′(S|S) = µ(S|S)− ε,
and
µ′′(T |S) = µ(T |S)− ε,
µ′′(S|S) = µ(S|S) + ε
where T ( S with µ(T |S) ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose we have defined µ′ and µ′′ for all sets with |S| ≤ l and let S with |S| = l + 1 be given.
If there exist no T ⊂ S and ST ⊂ S such that µ′(T |ST ) 6= µ′′(T |ST ) and µ(T |S) = µ(T |ST ), then
we set µ(T |S) = µ′(T |S) = µ′′(T |S) for all T ⊂ S. Otherwise, pick the smallest T for which such
ST exists. If µ
′(T |ST ) > µ′′(T |ST ), then let µ′(T |S) = µ(T |S) + ε and µ′′(T |S) = µ(T |S) − ε and
if µ′(T |ST ) < µ′′(T |ST ), then let µ′(T |S) = µ(T |S)− ε and µ′′(T |S) = µ(T |S) + ε. If T is the only
set for which such ST exists, then let T
′ be the largest set for which µ(T ′|S) ∈ (0, 1). Otherwise
T ′ denotes the other set for which ST ′ satisfying the description exists. If µ′(T |ST ) > µ′′(T |ST ),
then let µ′(T ′|S) = µ(T ′|S) − ε and µ′′(T ′|S) = µ(T ′|S) + ε and if µ′(T |ST ) < µ′′(T |ST ), then let
µ′(T ′|S) = µ(T ′|S) + ε and µ′′(T ′|S) = µ(T ′|S)− ε. For all other subsets µ, µ′, and µ′′ agree. We
proceed iteratively.
Lemma A.2. Suppose there exist T ⊂ S and ST ⊂ S such that µ′(T |ST ) 6= µ′′(T |ST ) and
µ(T |S) = µ(T |ST ). Then either T is the smallest set in S satisfying the description or we can set
ST = T .
Proof. The claim follows from Lemma A.1 when |S| = kµ + 1. Suppose the claim holds whenever
|S| ≤ l. We show that the claim holds when |S| = l + 1. Let T ⊂ S and ST ⊂ S satisfy the
description and suppose T is not the smallest set in S satisfying the description. Since µ′(T |ST ) 6=
µ′′(T |ST ), by construction, either T is the largest set satisfying µ(T |ST ) ∈ (0, 1) or there exists
SST ⊂ ST such that µ′(T |SST ) 6= µ′′(T |SST ) and µ(T |ST ) = µ(T |SST ). If the first case is true, then
since µ is monotonic, it must be the case that µ(T ′|T ) = µ(T ′|ST ) for all T ′ ⊂ T , and hence we are
done. In the second case, the claim follows from induction. 
Lemma A.3. For any S, there exist either zero or two subsets satisfying µ′(T |S) 6= µ′′(T |S).
Moreover if there are two sets satisfying the description, then µ′(T1|S) > µ′′(T1|S) if and only if
µ′(T2|S) < µ′′(T2|S).
Proof. The claim is trivial when |S| = kµ. Suppose the claim is true for all S with |S| ≤ l and let S
with |S| = l + 1 be given. If there is no T which satisfies the description in the construction, then
no subset will be affected. Suppose there exists only one such T . We show that there exists T ′ ⊃ T
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such that µ(T ′|S) ∈ (0, 1). To see this notice that by monotonicity property µ(T ′′|S) ≤ µ(T ′′|ST )
for all T ′′ ⊂ T . Since by induction there are two subsets of ST for which µ′(T |ST ) 6= µ′′(T |ST )
either µ(T ′′|S) < µ(T ′′|ST ) for some T ′′ ⊂ T or there exists T ′′′ ⊃ T such that µ(T ′′′|ST ) ∈ (0, 1).
In both cases,
∑
T ′′⊂T µ(T
′′|S) < 1 follows. Hence, there is T ′ ⊃ T such that µ(T ′|S) ∈ (0, 1). The
construction then guarantees that µ′(T ′|S) 6= µ′′(T ′|S) for some T ′ ⊃ T . Now suppose there are
three subsets, T1, T2, and T3, satisfying the description. Since µ is triangular, we can without loss
of generality assume that T1 ⊂ T2 ⊂ T3. By the previous lemma, we can without loss of generality
assume ST2 = T2 and ST3 = T3. But then since µ is monotonic, 3 subsets of ST3 must satisfy the
description, a contradiction to induction hypothesis.
To prove the second part of the claim, notice that the claim is follows from construction if
|S| = kµ. Suppose the claim holds whenever |S| ≤ l and let |S| = l+1 be given. If T2 = S, then the
claim follows from construction. If T2 ( S, then the claim follows from induction and construction
by considering the set T2. 
It is clear that µ = 12µ
′+ 12µ
′′. The previous lemmas also show that both µ′ and µ′′ are monotonic.
Hence, no µ ∈MT ()−AF() can be an extreme point. This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.
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(e) H0,5 : a5  a4  a3  a2  a1
Shown in the figure are empirical rejection
probabilities testing the five null hypothesis
through 5,000 simulations, with nominal size
0.05. Logit attention rule with ς = 2 is used,
as described in the text. For each simulation
repetition, five effective sample sizes are con-
sidered 50, 100, 200, 300 and 400.
Figure 2. Empirical Rejection Probabilities
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SA.1 Related Literature
Manzini and Mariotti (2014) and Brady and Rehbeck (2016) are the two closest related papers
to our work. Similar to ours, both models consider data of a single individual. Both provide
parametric random attention models, which are described in the third and fourth examples in
Section 2.1 of the main paper, respectively. Since their attention rules are monotonic, these models
are two interesting special cases of our random attention model. To provide an accurate comparison,
we need to introduce an outside/default option, which is required by both models. Thus, we first
extend RAM to accommodate an outside option and then offer a detailed comparison between our
work and both of these papers.
Let a∗ /∈ X be the default option. In the model with a default option, we will allow an empty
consideration set. Hence, now µ(·|S) is defined over all subsets of S including the empty set.
The default option is always available and can be interpreted as choosing nothing whenever the
consideration set is empty. Let X∗ = X ∪ {a∗} and S∗ = S ∪ {a∗} for all S ∈ X . We require that
the choice rule satisfy
∑
a∈S∗ pi(a|S) = 1 and pi(a|S) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ S∗. We say that a choice rule
pi has a random attention representation with a default option if there exists a preference ordering
 on X and a monotonic attention rule µ such that for each a ∈ S, pi(a|S) = ∑T⊂S 1(a is 
-best in T ) · µ(T |S). Thus pi(a∗|S) = µ(∅|S).
An implication of Assumption 1 in the main paper is that for all S, µ(∅|S) ≤ µ(∅|S − a). In
terms of choice probabilities, this implies that the default option satisfies regularity. In fact, it is
easy to see that regularity on default and acyclicity of P are necessary and sufficient for pi to have
a RAM representation with a default option.
Remark SA.1. A choice rule pi has a RAM representation with a default option if and only if it
satisfies acyclicity of P and regularity on default. y
In Manzini and Mariotti (2014), a choice rule has the representation
pi(a|S) = γ(a)
∏
b∈S:ba
(1− γ(b))
where γ(a) is the fixed consideration probability of alternative a. See Horan (2018a) for an axiomatic
characterization of this model when there is no default option. Demirkan and Kimya (2018) study
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a generalization of this model where γ depends on the menu. Independent consideration model is
a special case of RAM with a default option if we set
µ(T |S) =
∏
a∈T
γ(a)
∏
b∈S−T
(1− γ(b)).
In Brady and Rehbeck (2016), a choice rule has the representation
pi(a|S) =
∑
T⊂S 1(a ∈ T is -maximal in T) · w(T )∑
T⊂S w(T )
,
where w(T ) is the weight of consideration set T . This model is also a special case of RAM with an
outside option if we set
µ(T |S) = w(T )∑
T ′⊂S w(T ′)
.
Another closely related paper on random consideration sets is Aguiar (2015). In fact, acyclicity
of P appears as an axiom in his representation. Hence, his model is also a special case of RAM.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature which attempts to combine heterogeneous pref-
erences with random attention. The most closely related papers in this literature are Abaluck and
Adams (2017), Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2018), and Dardanoni, Manzini,
Mariotti, and Tyson (2018). In a general setup, Abaluck and Adams (2017) show that, by ex-
ploiting asymmetries in cross-partial derivatives, consideration set probabilities and utility can be
separately identified from observed choices when there is rich exogenous variation in observed co-
variates. Barseghyan et al. (2018) provide partial identification results when exogenous variation in
observed covariates is more restricted. As opposed to our paper, both of these papers consider het-
erogeneous preferences and do not assume observable variation in menus decision makers face. On
the other hand, we adopt abstract choice theory setup and our results do not rely on the existence
of observed covariates. Lastly, similar to previous papers, Dardanoni et al. (2018) study choices
from a fixed menu of alternatives. They consider aggregate choice where individuals might differ
both in terms of their consideration capacities and preferences. Their model is complementary to
ours as the attention rule each individual utilizes in their model can be considered a special case
of RAM.
2
We also compare our model with other random choice models even though they are not in the
framework of random consideration sets. Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) consider the
following model. There is a collection of attributes, denoted by Z. Each attribute z ∈ Z has a
weight v(z), and each alternative a ∈ X has intensity i(a, z) in attribute z. The decision maker first
randomly picks an attribute using Luce rule given the weights of all attributes. Then the decision
maker picks an alternative using Luce rule given the intensities of all alternatives in attribute z.
Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) show that any attribute rule is a random utility model.
Since RUM is a subset of RAM, any choice behavior that can be explained by an attribute rule
can also be explained by RAM.
Echenique and Saito (2019) consider a general Luce model (GLM) where the decision maker
uses Luce rule to choose among alternatives in her (deterministic) consideration set instead of the
whole choice set. See Ahumada and Ulku (2018) for a characterization of GLM and Horan (2018b)
for a related model. We show that RAM and GLM are distinct in terms of observed choices.
Recall Example 2 in the main paper, which cannot be explained by RAM. This example can be
explained by GLM by assuming that λi is the utility weight of the alternative i, and that whenever
an alternative is not chosen that is because the alternative does not belong to the consideration
set. Now consider a choice rule where all alternatives are always chosen with positive probability
but Luce’s IIA is not satisfied. We can construct such an example where acyclicity of P holds, and
hence the choice rule has a RAM representation. However, this choice behavior cannot be explained
by GLM as GLM reduces to Luce rule when all alternatives are chosen with positive probability in
all menus. Echenique and Saito (2019) also consider two interesting special cases of GLM: (i) in
two-stage Luce model, consideration sets are induced by an asymmetric, transitive binary relation,
(ii) in threshold Luce model, an alternative belongs to the consideration set only if its utility is not
too small compared to the utility of the maximal element in the choice set. It can be shown that
RAM and two-stage Luce model are distinct, and threshold Luce model is a subset of both models.
Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018) propose a model (PALM) which uses violations of
Luce’s IIA to reveal perception priority of alternatives. For an example of stochastic choice data
which can be explained by RAM but not PALM, consider any data where the outside option is
never chosen. When the outside option is never chosen, PALM reduces to Luce rule. However,
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RAM allows for violations of Luce’s IIA in the absence of an outside option. On the other hand,
RAM with an outside option satisfies regularity on default, but PALM does not necessarily satisfy
this property. Hence, RAM with an outside option does not nest PALM.
Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015) consider a model (Additive Perturbed Utility-APU)
where agents randomize as making deterministic choices can be costly. In their model, choices
satisfy regularity. Since any choice rule that satisfies regularity has a RAM representation, RAM
includes APU.
Aguiar, Boccardi, and Dean (2016) consider a satisficing model where the decision maker searches
till she finds an alternative above the satisficing utility level. If there is no alternative above the
satisficing utility level, the decision maker picks the best available alternative. They focus on two
special cases of this model: (i) Full Support Satisficing Model (FSSM) where in any menu each
alternative has a positive probability of being searched first, and (ii) Fixed Distribution Satisficing
Model (FDSM). They show that FDSM is a subset of RUM, and hence it is also a subset of RAM.
On the other hand, FSSM has no restrictions on observed choices if all alternatives are always
chosen with positive probability. Hence, there exist choice rules that can be explained by FSSM
but not RAM. Lastly, consider the choice data pi(a|{a, b, c}) = pi(a|{a, b}) = pi(a|{a, c}) = 1 and
pi(b|{b, c}) = 1/2. FSSM cannot explain this choice behavior even though regularity is satisfied.
Hence, FSSM and RAM are distinct, and FDSM is a subset of both.
SA.2 Other Examples of RAM
Here we provide more examples of random consideration sets that satisfy our key monotonicity
assumption (Assumption 1 in the main paper).
1. (Full Attention) The decision maker considers everything with probability one: µ(T |S) = 1(T =
S).
2. (Top N; Salant and Rubinstein, 2008) The decision maker faces a list of alternatives created by some
ordering. She pays attention to the first N elements among available alternatives (e.g., first page of
Google search results). If the number of available alternatives is less than N , she pays attention to the
entire set. Formally, let S(k,R) denote the set of first k elements in S according ordering R provided
that k ≤ |S|. (S(|S|, R) is equal to S.) In our framework: µ(T |S) = 1(T = S(min{|S|, N}, R)).
4
3. (Satisficing Consideration Set) The decision maker observes alternatives sequentially from a pre-
determined list. The order of alternatives is unknown to the decision maker in the beginning of the
search and uncovers them during the search process. The decision maker stops searching upon finding
a satisfactory alternative (Simon, 1955). If there is no such alternative, she searches the entire budget
set. Formally, given the list L, RSL(S) denotes the range of search (the consideration set) when the
budget set is S. In our framework: µ(T |S) = 1(T = RSL(S)).
4. (At Most k Alternatives) The decision maker considers at most k alternatives for any decision
problem. If there are more alternatives than k, she considers only subsets including exactly k alter-
natives with equal probability. If there are less alternatives than k, she considers everything. In our
framework:
µ(T |S) =

1 if |S| ≤ k and T = S(|S|
k
)−1
if |S| > k and |T | = k
0 otherwise
5. (Uniform Consideration) The decision maker considers any subset of the feasible set with equal
probabilities. That is, for all T ⊂ S, µ(T |S) = 1/(2|S| − 1).
6. (Fixed Correlated Consideration; Barbera` and Grodal, 2011; Aguiar, 2017) The decision maker
pays attention to each alternative with a fixed probability but the consideration of alternatives is
potentially correlated. Formally, let ω be a probability distribution over X . Then each alternative
a ∈ X is considered with a fixed probability ∑T∈X 1(a ∈ T ) · ω(T ) for all S 3 a. In our framework:
µ(T |S) =
∑
T ′∈X
1(T ′ ∩ S = T ) · ω(T ′).
7. (Ordered Logit Attention) This is another generalization of the logit attention example. The de-
cision maker ranks all subsets in terms of their attention priority, and she only considers subsets which
are maximal with respect to that ordering. When there are several best subsets, the decision maker
considers each of them with certain frequency as in the Logit Attention example. Thus, consideration
sets are constructed in the spirit of standard maximization paradigm. Formally, let D be a complete
and transitive priority order over subsets X . S D T reads as “S has a higher attention priority than
T”. The case when S and T have the same attention priority is denoted by S ./ T . Formally,
µ(T |S) =

wT∑
T ′⊂S 1(T ′./T )·wT ′ if T is D -best in S
0 otherwise
8. (Elimination by Aspects, General) The example is similar to the one given in the main text,
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except that when the decision maker picks an irrelevant aspect, she selects a subset at random drawn
from the uniform distribution. Formally,
µ(T |S) =
∑
Bi∩S=T
ω(i) +
1
2|S| − 1
∑
Bk∩S=∅
ω(k).
The probability that the decision maker selects an irrelevant aspect is
∑
k:Bk∩S=∅ ω(k). In this case,
T is randomly chosen, which is reflected by the number 1
2|S|−1 . We can generate similar examples. For
instance, if the initial screening is not successful (choosing an irrelevant aspect), the decision maker
may consider all the alternatives. Formally,
µ(T |S) =

∑
Bi∩S=T ω(i) if T 6= S∑
Bk∩S=S,∅ ω(k) if T = S
9. (Stochastic Satisficing) Suppose the satisficer faces multiple lists. The probability that the deci-
sion maker faces list L is denoted by p(L). As opposed to Example 3, consideration sets are stochastic.
Formally,
µ(T |S) =
∑
L:T=RSL(S)
p(L)
where RSL(S) is the range of search when the budget set is S and L is the list.
10. (1/N Rule) The decision maker utilizes N different sources of recommendations with equal proba-
bilities. Given a fixed source s, she considers only top ks alternatives according to ordering Rs that
source s is using, which could be different from her preference. For example, she utilizes either Google
or Yahoo with equal probability. Once she decides which one to look at, she pays attention to only
the products appearing in the first page of the corresponding search result. Formally,
µ(T |S) =
∣∣{s‖T = S(min{ks, |S|}, Rs)}∣∣
N
where S(k,R) denotes the first k alternatives in S according to R.
11. (Random Product Network; Masatlioglu and Suleymanov, 2017) Consider a decision maker faced
with a product network N . If (a, b) ∈ N , then the decision maker who considers a is recommended
alternative b (or alternatively, b is linked to a). The decision maker starts search from a random
starting point. Given a realized starting point in the product network, the decision maker considers
all alternatives which are directly or indirectly linked to that starting point. Formally, let η be a
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probability distribution on X. Then
µ(T |S) =
∑
a∈S
1(T = Na(S)) · η(a)∑
b∈S η(b)
where Na(S) denotes all alternatives which are directly or indirectly linked to a in S.
12. (Path Dependent Consideration; Suleymanov, 2018) This example is similar to the one above,
except that now the decision maker starts searching from a fixed starting point a∗ /∈ X (the default
option) and takes a random path on a network. Let X∗ = X ∪ {a∗}, and Pa∗ stands for all possible
paths in X∗ with the initial node a∗. When the choice set is X, the decision maker takes the path
ρ ∈ Pa∗ with probability γ(ρ). Given ρ ∈ Pa∗ and S ∈ X , ρS ∈ Pa∗ is the subpath of ρ in S with
the same initial node a∗. For any ρ, let V (ρ) be the vertices of the path ρ excluding the initial node.
Then
µ(T |S) =
∑
ρ∈Pa∗
1(T = V (ρS)) · γ(ρ).
This model is a subset of RAM with a default option.
SA.3 Limited Data
We discuss how our results can be adapted to handle limited data, that is, settings where not all possible
choice probabilities or choice problems are observed. To investigate the implications of random attention
models with limited data, assume that we observe choices from the set of choice problems S. Let piobs denote
the observed choice behavior. We say that piobs is consistent with the random attention model if there exists
pi defined on the entire domain X such that pi(a|S) = piobs(a|S) for all S ∈ S and pi is a RAM. We call
such pi an extension of piobs. As de Clippel and Rozen (2014) point out, it is possible that piobs satisfies the
acyclicity of P even though it is inconsistent with RAM. Here we provide an example with stochastic choices
in which the same problem occurs.
Example SA.1. Let S = {{a, b, c, d}, {b, c, d}, {a, c}}. Consider the following choice rule.
piobs(·|S) S = {a, b, c, d} {b, c, d} {a, c}
a 1/4 1/5
b 1/4 1/5
c 1/4 3/5 4/5
d 1/4 1/5
In this example, we observe choices only from 3 choice problems instead of 15 potential choice problems.
7
We show that these observations are sufficient to conclude that piobs is not consistent with RAM. Suppose
there exists a RAM pi that extends piobs. Then the observation pi(a|{a, b, c, d}) > pi(a|{a, c}) tells us that
either aPb or aPd. To see this, notice that at least one of pi(a|{a, b, c, d}) > pi(a|{a, c, d}) and pi(a|{a, c, d}) >
pi(a|{a, c}) must hold or we get a contradiction. On the other hand, from pi(b|{a, b, c, d}) > pi(b|{b, c, d}) and
pi(d|{a, b, c, d}) > pi(d|{b, c, d}) we learn that dPa and bPa. Hence, even though acyclicity of P is satisfied on
the limited domain, there does not exist an extension of piobs that is RAM. y
From the example above we can note the following: if piobs(a|S) > piobs(a|S − A), then it must be that
aPb for some b ∈ A. Now suppose piobs(a|S) + piobs(b|S′) > 1 and {a, b} ⊂ S ∩ S′ where a 6= b. Then if pi is
an extension of piobs it has to be the case that either pi(a|S) > pi(a|S ∩ S′) or pi(b|S) > pi(b|S ∩ S′). Hence,
either aPc for some c ∈ S − S′ or bPd for some d ∈ S′ − S. This is exactly the probabilistic analog of the
condition in de Clippel and Rozen (2014). However, this condition is not enough in probabilistic domain.
The next example illustrates this point.
Example SA.2. Consider the following choice rule.
piobs(·|S) S = {a, b, c, d} {a, b, c, e} {a, b, d} {a, c, d} {b, c, e}
a 1/4 2/3 1/2 1/2
b 1/4 1/6 1/2 5/6
c 1/4 0 1/2 1/12
d 1/4 0 0
e 1/6 1/12
First, piobs(d|{a, b, d}) < piobs(d|{a, b, c, d}) and piobs(d|{a, c, d}) < piobs(d|{a, b, c, d}) imply that dPc and
dPb. Furthermore, piobs(e|{b, c, e}) < piobs(e|{a, b, c, e}) implies that ePa. Now consider the set {a, b, c} and
notice that piobs(a|{a, b, c, e}) + piobs(b|{a, b, c, d}) + piobs(c|{a, b, c, d}) > 1. Thus if we had observations on
the choice problem {a, b, c} one of the following would have been true: (i) the probability that a is chosen
decreases when e is removed from the choice problem {a, b, c, e}, (ii) the probability that b is chosen decreases
when d is removed from the choice problem {a, b, c, d}, or (iii) the probability that c is chosen decreases when
d is removed from the choice problem {a, b, c, d}. Hence, one of the following must be true: aPe, bPd, or
cPd. Since we have a contradiction in all cases, piobs is inconsistent with RAM. y
We generalize the intuition from this example. Suppose there exists a collection of pairs (ai, Si)
m
i=1 such
that {a1, . . . , am} ⊂
⋂m
i=1 Si and
∑m
i=1 piobs(ai, Si) > 1 where ai are all distinct. Now in the choice problem⋂m
i=1 Si the probability that ai is chosen must decrease for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. From here we can
conclude that aiPbi for some bi ∈ Si − (S1 ∩ · · · ∩ Si−1 ∩ Si+1 ∩ · · · ∩ Sm) for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Hence,
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the existence of an acyclic P that satisfies this condition is necessary for piobs to be consistent with RAM.
Theorem SA.1 shows that it is also sufficient.
Theorem SA.1. A choice rule piobs is consistent with RAM if and only if there exists an acyclic bi-
nary relation P on X which satisfies the following: for any collection (ai, Si)
m
i=1 with distinct ai such that
{a1, . . . , am} ⊂
⋂m
i=1 Si and
∑m
i=1 piobs(ai, Si) > 1, aiPbi for some bi ∈ Si− (S1 ∩ · · · ∩Si−1 ∩Si+1 ∩ · · · ∩Sm)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. Let  be a transitive completion of P. We reorder the alternatives in X such that a1,  · · ·  aK,.
We define µ as follows. For any S ∈ S,
µ(T |S) =
 piobs(ak,|S) if ∃ k s.t. T = Lk, ∩ S0 otherwise
where Lk, = {ak,, . . . , aK,}. For any S ∈ X − S, if there is S′ ∈ S with S′ ⊃ S, then
µ(T |S) = max
S′∈S:S′⊃S
µ(T |S′) if T ( S
and µ(S|S) = 1−∑T(S µ(T |S). Finally, for S ∈ X − S, if there is no S′ ∈ S with S′ ⊃ S, then µ(S|S) = 1
and µ(T |S) = 0 for all T ( S.
It is easily seen that (, µ) represents piobs. We first need to show that µ(·|S) is a probability distribution.
The only case we need to check is when S ∈ X − S and there exists S′ ⊃ S with S′ ∈ S. We need
to show that µ(S|S) ≥ 0 or that ∑T(S µ(T |S) ≤ 1. Suppose ∑T(S µ(T |S) > 1. By definition, for
each T ( S such that µ(T |S) > 0, there exists a pair (akT , ST ) such that ST ∈ S with ST ⊃ S and
µ(T |S) = µ(T |ST ) = piobs(akT |ST ) where T = LakT , ∩ ST . Then,
∑
T(S piobs(akT |ST ) > 1. Notice that
since µ is triangular, akT are distinct. By definition of P, there exist T ( S and an alternative bkT in ST −S
such that akTPbkT . But this is a contradiction as bkT /∈ T and T = LakT , ∩ ST .
We now need to show that µ defined as above is monotonic. We have a few cases to consider.
Case 1: S, S − b ∈ S. Suppose µ(T |S) > µ(T |S − b) where b /∈ T . Since S ∈ S and µ(T |S) > 0 it must
be that T = Lk, ∩ S for some k and µ(T |S) = piobs(ak,|S). Since b /∈ T and T = Lk, ∩ S we must have
b  ak,. Therefore, it must be the case that T = Lk,∩(S−b). By definition, µ(T |S−b) = piobs(ak,|S−b).
But then we have piobs(ak,|S) > piobs(ak,|S − b) which implies that ak,Pb, a contradiction.
Case 2: S ∈ S, S − b /∈ S. Let T with b /∈ T given. Since S ∈ S it must be that either µ(T |S) = 0 in
which case monotonicity is trivial or T = Lk, ∩ S for some k and µ(T |S) = piobs(ak,|S). First, suppose
T ( S − b. Now S ⊃ S − b, and hence by definition, µ(T |S − b) = max
S′∈S:S′⊃S−b
µ(T |S′) ≥ µ(T |S). This
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establishes that the claim holds for all T ( S− b. Notice that if µ(T |S− b) = µ(T |S) for all T ( S− b, then
µ(S − b|S − b) ≥ µ(S − b|S) also follows.
Suppose µ(S − b|S) > µ(S − b|S − b). Then since µ(S − b|S) > 0 and µ is triangular we must have that
b is  maximal in S. Thus µ(S|S) = piobs(b|S). Furthermore, by the argument in the previous paragraph,
there exists T ( S − b such that µ(T |S − b) > µ(T |S). Suppose there exists only one such T . (A similar
argument will work if there is more than one such T .) By definition, there exists ST ∈ S with ST ⊃ S − b
such that µ(T |ST ) > µ(T |S). Thus there exists akT such that µ(T |S − b) = µ(T |ST ) = piobs(akT |ST ) and
T = LakT , ∩ ST = LakT , ∩ (S − b) where the second equality follows from the fact that T ⊂ S − b. Notice
that akT ∈ S − b and since b is  maximal in S we have b  akT . Hence we have T = LakT , ∩ S which by
definition implies µ(T |S) = piobs(akT |S) < piobs(akT |ST ). Now since by assumption µ(T ′|S) = µ(T ′|S − b)
for all T ′ ( S − b with T ′ 6= T , by using the definition of µ, µ(S − b|S) > µ(S − b|S − b) implies that
piobs(b|S) + piobs(akT |S) < piobs(akT |ST ). Consider the collection {(akT , ST )} ∪ {(ai, S)|ai ∈ S and ai 6=
b, ai 6= akT }. Since piobs(akT |ST ) + (1 − piobs(akT |S) − piobs(b|S)) > 1, the observed choice probabilities
summed over this collection adds up to greater than one. By definition of P, either there exists an alternative
in ai ∈ S − b such that aiPb or there exists an alternative c ∈ ST − (S − b) such that akTPc. The first
case leads to a contradiction since b is  maximal in S. The second case leads to a contradiction since
T = LakT , ∩ ST = LakT , ∩ (S − b) 63 c.
Case 3: S /∈ S, S − b ∈ S. If there exists no S′ ⊃ S such that S′ ∈ S, then monotonicity property
is trivial as µ(S|S) = 1. Hence, suppose there is S′ ⊃ S such that S′ ∈ S and there exists T ⊂ S − b
such that µ(T |S) > µ(T |S − b). Let akT and ST be such that ST ⊃ S and µ(T |S) = piobs(akT |ST ) where
T = LakT , ∩ ST . Also notice that since akT ∈ T ⊂ S − b, akT 6= b. By definition of µ, it must be that
piobs(akT |ST ) > piobs(akT |S − b). Now consider the collection {(akT , ST )} ∪ {(ai, S − b)|ai ∈ S − b, ai 6= akT }.
If we add the choice probabilities over this collection, they will add up to greater than one. Hence, by
definition of P, there exists c ∈ ST − (S− b) such that akTPc. But this is a contradiction as T = LakT ,∩ST
and T ⊂ S − b.
Case 4: S /∈ S, S− b /∈ S. If there is no S′ ⊃ S such that S′ ∈ S, then the claim is trivial. Suppose there
exists such S′. Consider T ( S − b. By definition,
µ(T |S) = µ
S′⊃S:S′∈S
(T |S′) ≤ µ
S′′⊃S−b:S′′∈S
(T |S′′) = µ(T |S − b).
Hence, the claim holds for all T ( S− b. We need to show that the claim also holds when T = S− b. Notice
that if µ(T |S) = µ(T |S − b) for all T ( S − b, then µ(S − b|S) ≤ µ(S − b|S − b) follows immediately. Hence
suppose there is at least one T such that µ(T |S) < µ(T |S − b).
Now if b is not  maximal in S, then µ(S−b|S) = 0 and monotonicity is trivial. So suppose b is  maximal
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and µ(S − b|S) > µ(S − b|S − b). For each T ( S − b such that µ(T |S − b) > 0, let akT and ST be such
that µ(T |S − b) = piobs(akT |ST ). Let akS−b and SS−b be such that µ(S − b|S) = piobs(akS−b |SS−b). Consider
the collection {(akT , ST )| T ⊂ S − b}. Since µ(S − b|S) > µ(S − b|S − b), if we sum choice probabilities
over this collection, they add up to greater than one. This implies that akTPc for some T ⊂ S − b and for
some c /∈ S − b. But this is a contradiction since only sets of the form T = LakT , ∩ ST are considered with
positive probability and c /∈ T . 
SA.4 Estimation and Inference
Here we first provide the proof of Theorem 4 in the main paper. We then discuss the computational cost of
our inference procedure, following which we connect our inference approach to the “J-test” method. Then,
we demonstrate how the matrix R can be constructed in a limited data scenario. Finally we discuss other
possible ways to construct the critical value.
SA.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4
For completeness and notational clarity, we first present two lemmas, which follow from the central limit
theorem.
Lemma SA.1. Under Assumption 2 in the main paper,
√
NS
(
pˆiS − piS
)
 N
(
0, Ωpi,S
)
, Ωpi,S = diag(piS)− piSpi′S ,
where NS =
∑
1≤i≤N 1(Yi = S) is the effective sample size of menu S, N (0,Ωpi,S) is the |S|-dimensional
Gaussian distribution with mean zero and covariance Ωpi,S , and diag is the operator constructing diagonal
matrices.
The asymptotic distribution is degenerate for two reasons. First, the choice rule, by construction, has to
sum up to 1. Second, it is possible that some of the alternatives in S is never chosen (either in the sample
or the population).
Lemma SA.2. Under Assumption 2 in the main paper,
√
N
(
pˆi − pi
)
 N
(
0, Ωpi
)
,
where the asymptotic variance Ωpi is block diagonal, with blocks given by
1
P[Yi=S]Ωpi,S , S ∈ X . (Block
diagonality of the asymptotic variance follows directly from the fact that across choice problems, choice rules
are estimated with independent samples, hence are independent.)
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Recall that T () = √N max((Rpˆi)  σˆ)+. The next proposition shows that its distribution is ap-
proximated by the infeasible statistic
√
N max(R(z? + pi) σˆ)+. For clarity, we do not seek uniformity
here. Later we will show how the same argument can be used to demonstrate distributional approximation
uniformly in a class of DGPs (see Proposition SA.2).
Proposition SA.1. Suppose Assumption 2 in the main paper holds and min(σpi,) > 0. Then
∣∣∣P[T () ≤ t]− P?[√N max(R(z? + pi) σˆ)+ ≤ t]∣∣∣→P 0, ∀t 6= 0.
Remark SA.2. We exclude t = 0 since the limiting distribution may have a point mass at the origin. y
Proof. Let f be a bounded Lipschitz function. Without loss of generality assume its Lipschitz constant is 1,
and 2 · ‖f‖∞ = c. For convenience, denote E[f(·)] by Ef [·].
By the central limit theorem, it is possible to construct a (sequence of) random vector z˜ ∼ N (0,Ωpi/N)
such that |√N(pˆi − pi) − √N z˜| = OP(1/
√
N) (we postpone the proof to the end). Further, let w? ∼
N (0, I/√N) with suitable dimension such that Ωˆ1/2w? ∼ z?. Then consider bounds on the following
quantities.
∣∣∣∣Ef[√N max(Rpˆi  σˆ)
+
]
− Ef
[√
N max
(
Rpˆi  σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣∣
≤ E
[∣∣∣√N max(Rpˆi  σˆ)
+
−
√
N max
(
Rpˆi  σpi,
)
+
∣∣∣ ∧ c]
≤ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpˆi  σˆ)
+
−
√
N
(
Rpˆi  σpi,
)
+
∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
= E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpˆi  σˆ −Rpˆi  σpi,)
+
 1
(
Rpˆi ≥ 0
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
≤ E
[∥∥∥√N(R(pˆi − pi) σˆ −R(pˆi − pi) σpi,)
+
∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
+ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpi  σˆ −Rpi  σpi,)
+
 1
(
Rpˆi ≥ 0
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
.
The first inequality uses Lipschitz property of f and the fact that the whole term is bounded by 2 ·‖f‖∞ = c.
The second inequality uses basic property of the max operator. The third inequality follows from triangle
inequality of the norm ‖ · ‖∞.
We further split in order to control the denominator:
previous display
≤ E
[∥∥∥√N(R(pˆi − pi) σˆ −R(pˆi − pi) σpi,)
+
∥∥∥
∞
1
(
min(σˆ) ≥ min(σpi,)/2
)
∧ c
]
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+ P
[
min(σˆ) < min(σpi,)/2
]
· c
+ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpi  σˆ −Rpi  σpi,)
+
 1
(
Rpˆi ≥ 0
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
= O
( 1√
N
)
+ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpi  σˆ −Rpi  σpi,)
+
 1
(
Rpˆi ≥ 0
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
≤ O
( 1√
N
)
+ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpi  σˆ −Rpi  σpi,)
+
 1
(
Rpi ≥ − an√
N
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
+ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpi  σˆ −Rpi  σpi,)
+
 1
(
Rpˆi ≥ 0, Rpi < − an√
N
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
≤ O
( 1√
N
)
+ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpi  σˆ −Rpi  σpi,)
+
 1
(
Rpi ≥ − an√
N
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
+ E
[∥∥∥1(Rpˆi ≥ 0, Rpi < − an√
N
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
= O
( 1√
N
+
an√
N
+
1
an
)
,
with an →∞ chosen so that the last line vanishes.
∣∣∣Ef[√N max(Rpˆi  σpi,)
+
]
− Ef
[√
N max
(
R(z˜ + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣
≤ E
[∥∥∥√N(Rpˆi  σpi,)
+
−
√
N
(
R(z˜ + pi) σpi,
)
+
∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
≤ E
[√
N
∥∥∥Rpˆi  σpi, −R(z˜ + pi) σpi,∥∥∥∞ ∧ c]
= E
[√
N
∥∥∥R(pˆi − pi) σpi, −Rz˜ σpi,∥∥∥∞ ∧ c]
= OP
( 1√
N
)
.
The first inequality uses Lipschitz continuity of f and property of the max operator. The second inequality
drops positivity. The rate in the last line comes from the coupling requirement of z˜.
∣∣∣Ef[√N max(R(z˜ + pi) σpi,)
+
]
− E?f
[√
N max
(
R(Ω1/2pi w
? + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣ = 0,
since the two terms have the same distribution.
∣∣∣E?f[√N max(R(Ω1/2pi w? + pi) σpi,)
+
]
− E?f
[√
N max
(
R(Ωˆ
1/2
w? + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣
≤ E?
[∥∥∥√N(R(Ω1/2pi w? + pi) σpi,)
+
−
√
N
(
R(Ωˆ
1/2
w? + pi) σpi,
)
+
∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
≤ E?
[√
N
∥∥∥R(Ω1/2pi w? + pi) σpi, −R(Ωˆ1/2w? + pi) σpi,∥∥∥∞ ∧ c]
= E?
[√
N
∥∥∥RΩ1/2pi w?  σpi, −RΩˆ1/2w?  σpi,∥∥∥∞ ∧ c]
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= OP
( 1√
N
)
.
The first inequality uses Lipschitz continuity of f and property of the max operator. The second inequality
drops positivity. The rate in the last line comes from the fact
√
N‖Ωˆ−Ωpi‖∞ = OP(1). Also, by construction
w? = OP?(1/
√
N).
∣∣∣E?f[√N max(R(Ωˆ1/2w? + pi) σpi,)
+
]
− E?f
[√
N max
(
R(Ωˆ
1/2
w? + pi) σˆ
)
+
]∣∣∣
≤ E?
[∥∥∥√N(R(Ωˆ1/2w? + pi) σpi,)
+
−
√
N
(
R(Ωˆ
1/2
w? + pi) σˆ
)
+
∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
= E?
[∥∥∥√N(R(Ωˆ1/2w? + pi) σpi, −R(Ωˆ1/2w? + pi) σˆ)
+
 1
(
R(Ωˆ
1/2
w? + pi) ≥ 0
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
≤ E?
[∥∥∥√N(RΩˆ1/2w?  σpi, −RΩˆ1/2w?  σˆ)
+
∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
+ E?
[∥∥∥√N(Rpi  σpi, −Rpi  σˆ)
+
 1
(
R(Ωˆ
1/2
w? + pi) ≥ 0
)∥∥∥
∞
∧ c
]
= OP
(
1√
N
+
an√
N
+
1
an
)
.
The first inequality uses Lipschitz continuity of f and property of the max operator. The second inequality
applies triangle inequality to the norm ‖ · ‖∞. The rest is essentially the same as that of the first part.
The only missing part is to show the existence of the coupling variable z˜. Since the choice probabilities
are averages of indicators, Corollary 4.1 of Chen, Goldstein, and Shao (2010) implies the following non-
asymptotic bound on the Wasserstein metric:
inf
{
E [|X − Y |] : X ∼
√
N(pˆi − pi), Y ∼ N (0,Ωpi)
}
≤ Const.
√
1
minS∈X NS
,
where the infimum is taken over all joint distributions with the given marginals, and the constant in the
above display is universal. By Assumption 2 in the main paper, the rate on the RHS is proportional to√
1/N . Existence of the coupling variable follows from the bounds on the Wasserstein metric.
Hence we showed that
∣∣∣∣Ef[√N max(Rpˆi  σˆ)
+
]
− E?f
[√
N max
(
R(Ωˆ
1/2
w? + pi) σˆ
)
+
]∣∣∣∣ = oP(1).

Now we show how the previous result can be generalized to be uniform among a class of distributions.
The main argument used in Proposition SA.1 remains almost unchanged.
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Proposition SA.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4 in the main paper,
sup
pi∈Π
P
[∣∣∣P[T () ≤ t]− P?[√N max(R(z? + pi) σˆ)+ ≤ t]∣∣∣ > ε]→ 0, ∀ε > 0, ∀t 6= 0.
Proof. The proof remains almost the same, while extra care is needed for the coupling argument, which we
demonstrate below. We would like to bound the following quantity uniformly :
∣∣∣Ef[√N max(Rpˆi  σpi,)
+
]
− E?f
[√
N max
(
R(Ω1/2pi w
? + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣,
where f is a bounded function with Lipschitz constant 1. By the coupling argument in the proof of Propo-
sition SA.1, it is possible to construct, for each pi ∈ Π, a random variable z˜pi ∼ N (0,Ωpi/N) (the covariance
matrix Ωpi depends on pi, indicated by the subscript), such that
E
[∣∣∣√N(pˆi − pi)−√N z˜pi∣∣∣] ≤ Const.√ 1
minS∈X NS
.
Then we can bound the aforementioned quantity by
∣∣∣Ef[√N max(Rpˆi  σpi,)
+
]
− E?f
[√
N max
(
R(Ω1/2pi w
? + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Ef[√N max(Rpˆi  σpi,)
+
]
− Ef
[√
N max
(
R(z˜pi + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣Ef[√N max(R(z˜pi + pi) σpi,)
+
]
− E?f
[√
N max
(
R(Ω1/2pi w
? + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Ef[√N max(Rpˆi  σpi,)
+
]
− Ef
[√
N max
(
R(z˜pi + pi) σpi,
)
+
]∣∣∣,
where the second line comes from triangle inequality, and the equality uses the fact that z˜pi and Ω
1/2
pi w
?
have the same distribution. Hence we have the bound:
previous display -
√
1
minS∈X NS
,
with the estimate in the above display being uniformly valid over pi ∈ Π. Hence the proof reduces to bound
the probability (choose some ε > 0 small enough):
sup
pi∈Π
P
[
min
S∈X
NS < εN
]
= sup
pi∈Π
P
[
NS
N
< ε, ∃S
]
≤ sup
pi∈Π
∑
S∈X
P
[
NS
N
< ε
]
= sup
pi∈Π
∑
S∈X
P
[
NS − P[Yi = S]N
N
< ε− P[Yi = S]
]
≤ sup
pi∈Π
∑
S∈X
exp
(
−(ε− P[Yi = S])2N
2
)
→ 0.
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For the inequality in the first line, we use union bound. The last line uses Hoeffding’s inequality, which is
valid for any ε smaller than infpi∈Π minS∈X P[Yi = S] ≥ p (see Assumption 2 in the main paper). Hence we
demonstrated that √
1
minS∈X NS
P
√
1
N
, uniformly in Π.

Now we demonstrate how Theorem 4 in the main paper follows from the previous proposition.
Recall that in constructing T ?(), we use κ−1N (Rpˆi)− to replace the unknown Rpi. This unknown
quantity is bounded above by 0 uniformly in Π, since this class only contains choice rules that are compatible
with . At the same time, κ−1N (Rpˆi)− converges to 0 in probability uniformly for the class Π. Therefore
asymptotically T ?() stochastically dominates T () uniformly in Π, which proves Theorem 4 in the main
paper.
SA.4.2 Computation
The number of rows in the constraint matrix is
#row(R) =
∑
S∈X
∑
a,b∈S
1(b ≺ a) =
∑
S∈X , |S|≥2
(|S|
2
)
=
K∑
k=2
(
K
k
)(
k
2
)
,
where K = |X| is the number of alternatives in the grand set X. Not surprisingly, the number of constraints
increases very fast with the size of the grand set. However, we note that as long as the matrix R has
been constructed for one preference , constraint matrices for other preference orderings can be obtained
by column permutations of R. As a result, even though the construction of R might be computationally
demanding with many alternatives available (i.e., when K is large), this step (Algorithm 1 in the main paper)
only needs to be implemented once. This is particular useful and saves computation if there are multiple
hypotheses to be tested.
We showcase how the proposed inference procedure is computationally attractive, especially when inference
is conducted for many preferences. Table SA.1 records the computing time needed using our companion R
package ramchoice. Note that the time reflects not only the time needed to construct the constraint matrices,
but also 2,000 simulations from a multivariate normal distribution to obtain critical values.
Our general-purpose implementation executes very fast even when 720 different preference orderings are
tested, and given that there are 240 constraints for testing one single preference. The full execution takes
less than 7 minutes. Moreover, since the major computing time comes from constructing the constraint
matrix R when testing many preferences, which involves looping over all choice problems and alternatives,
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Table SA.1. Computing Time (K = 6 and K! = 720)
Num. of Time Num. of Time
Preferences (seconds) Preferences (seconds)
1 1.117 50 21.185
5 2.668 100 40.422
10 4.584 400 195.907
20 8.948 720 407.177
There are K = 6 alternatives, leading to potentially K! = 720 preference orderings. All choice problems are
observable in the data. For each preference, there are 240 inequality constraints in the matrix R. The sample size
is N = 12, 600, and M = 2, 000 simulations are used to construct critical value. System: MacOS 10.13.1, R 3.4.1.
it is possible to further speed up our general-purpose implementation by employing low-level programming
languages such as C++, which are faster for simple for-loop structures.
SA.4.3 Connection to J-tests
The testing methods we proposed are connected to a class of inference strategies based on projection residuals,
sometimes also known as J-tests. To describe this alternative inference approach, recall that any preference
induces a surjective map from attention rules to choice rules (Definition 3 in the main paper), denoted
by C˜. Then, by our definition of partially identified preferences,  ∈ Θpi if and only if pi belongs to
{C˜µ : Rµ ≤ 0}, where R represents the monotonicity assumption imposed on attention rules. Therefore,
inference can be based on
 ∈ Θpi if and only if inf
µ: Rµ≤0
(pi − C˜µ)′W(pi − C˜µ) = 0,
where W is some positive definite weighting matrix. Hence, a preference compatible with pi is equivalent to
a zero residual from projecting pi to the corresponding set {C˜µ : Rµ ≤ 0}. For example, this strategy is
used by Kitamura and Stoye (2018) in random utility models.
To see the connection of J-tests to moment inequality testing, observe that if the mapping defined by C˜
is invertible, then the above reduces to
 ∈ Θpi if and only if RC˜−1 pi ≤ 0.
Such reduction may not be feasible analytically, or it may be numerically prohibitive. With a careful
inspection of our problem, we showed that it is without loss of generality to focus on triangular attention
rules, which can be uniquely constructed from preferences and choice rules. That is, we showed how the
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inversion C˜−1 is constructed, which is denoted by C in Theorem 3 in the main paper and its proof.
Moreover, we provided an algorithm which constructs the constraint matrix directly, avoiding the detour of
forming it as the product of two matrices.
Compared to directly testing inequality constraints as we propose, employing a J-test inference proce-
dure has two potential drawbacks. First, the J-test statistic is essentially the (weighted) Euclidean norm
of the projection residual, which may suffer from low power if only a few inequalities are violated. Second,
constructing the projection residual requires numerical minimization, which can be computationally costly
especially when the dimension of µ is nontrivial. This is apparent from Table SA.1: testing a single pref-
erence takes about one second and testing for all 720 preference orderings takes about 7 minutes with our
procedure, while employing the J-test can easily take a prohibitive amount of time because of the costly nu-
merical optimization step over a possibly high-dimensional parameter space and the fact that this numerical
optimization has to be done multiple times to construct a critical value. For example, in the same setting of
Table SA.1, employing the J-test with 2, 000 bootstraps takes about 90 minutes for just one single preference
when employing the quadratic programming procedure quadprog in Matlab (R2016b).
SA.4.4 Implementation with Limited Data
In some cases not all choice problems S ∈ X may be observed for two reasons. First, some choice problems
are ruled out a priori in the population due to, for instance, capacity or institutional constraints. Second,
certain choice problems may not be available in a given finite sample due to sampling variability. Even if all
choice problems are observed in the data, some may have only a few appearances, and usually are dropped
from empirical analysis to avoid dealing with small (effective) sample sizes. We descibe how our econometric
methods (and assumptions) can also be adapted to situations of limited data.
Recall that S ⊂ X denotes the collection of all observable choice problems. From an econometric per-
spective, this can also be seen as the collection of realized choice problems in the data. Assumption 2 in the
main paper now takes the following form.
Assumption SA.1 (DGP with Limited Data). The data is a random sample of choice problems Yi and
corresponding choices yi, {(yi, Yi) : yi ∈ Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, generated by the underlying choice rule P[yi =
a|Yi = S] = pi(a|S), and that P[Yi = S] ≥ p > 0 for all S ∈ S.
The most critical concern is on Assumption 1 in the main paper, which directly affects how the constraint
matrix R is constructed. We state a seemingly “stronger” version of that assumption.
Assumption SA.2 (Monotonic Attention with Limited Data). For any A ⊂ S − T , µ(T |S) ≤ µ(T |S −A).
18
When S = X , this assumption is equivalent to Assumption 1 in the main paper. To see this fact, pick
an arbitrary A ⊂ S − T and let a1, a2, · · · be an enumeration of elements of A. Then, µ(T |S)− µ(T |S −A)
can be written as µ(T |S) − µ(T |S − a1) +
∑
j≥1[µ(T |S − a1 − · · · − aj) − µ(T |S − a1 − · · · − aj − aj+1)],
where by Assumption 1 in the main paper each summand is nonpositive, hence Assumption 1 in the main
paper implies Assumption SA.2. The other direction is obvious: Assumption SA.2 implies Assumption 1 in
the main paper.
If S does not contain all possible choice problems, however, Assumption SA.2 provides a proper notion of
monotonicity. To see the extra identification and statistical power implied by Assumption SA.2, two examples
are provided after we give a proper definition of compatible preferences and the algorithm of constructing
the constraint matrix in this context.
With limited data, unfortunately, there are two ways to generalize the previous definition, which are not
equivalent. Recall that piobs denotes the observed choice rule, defined only on S, while we reserve the notation
pi to a choice rule that is defined on X . Following is the first version.
Definition SA.1 (Compatible Preferences with Limited Data, I). Let piobs be the underlying choice rule/data
generating process. A preference  is compatible with piobs on S, denoted by  ∈ Θpiobs , if (piobs,) is a
RAM on S.
The other version is the following:
Definition SA.2 (Compatible Preferences with Limited Data, II). Let piobs be the underlying choice
rule/data generating process. A preference  is compatible with piobs on X , denoted by  ∈ Ξpiobs , if
piobs has an extension pi to X such that (pi,) is a RAM on X .
When S = X , the two definitions agree, and also agree with the definition given in the main paper. If S
is a proper subset of X , however, Θpiobs can be larger than Ξpiobs . Depending on the goal of analysis, both
can be of interest, while Ξpiobs is much more difficult to characterize empirically.
The following algorithm generalizes the one given in the main text to the limited data scenario. The
constraint matrix provided in this algorithm can be used to characterize Θpiobs .
Consider now two examples with limited data.
Example SA.3 (Limited Data and Identification). Assume S = {{a, b, c, d}, {a, b}}, and we are interested
in the null hypothesis that c  b  d  a. Assumption 1 in the main paper does not impose any constraint,
since it only requires comparing choice problems that differ by one element. On the other hand, SA.2 implies
the constraint that pi(a|{a, b, c, d}) ≤ pi(a|{a, b}), since violating this constraint is equivalent to a  c or
a  d, which is incompatible with our hypothesis. y
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Algorithm 1’ Construction of R with Limited Data.
Require: Set a preference .
R ← empty matrix
for S in S do
for T in S and T ⊂ S do
for a ≺ S − T do
R ← add row corresponding to piobs(a|S)− piobs(a|T ) ≤ 0.
end for
end for
end for
Example SA.4 (Limited Data and Statistical Power). Consider S = {{a, b, c, d}, {a, b, c}, {a, b}}. This is
one example of limited data, but due to the special structure of S, constraints implied by the two assumptions
are equivalent in population. Consider the preference a  c  d  b , then Assumption 1 in the main paper
gives two constraints, (i) pi(b|{a, b, c, d}) ≤ pi(b|{a, b, c}) and (ii) pi(b|{a, b, c}) ≤ pi(b|{a, b}). Assumption
SA.2, however, will give the extra condition (iii) pi(b|{a, b, c, d}) ≤ pi(b|{a, b}). In population, this extra
constraint is redundant, since it is not possible to violate (iii) without violating at least one of (i) and (ii).
When applied to finite sample, however, the extra condition (iii) is no longer redundant, and may help
to improve statistical power. To see this, assume (i) is violated by δ > 0, a small margin, so is (ii). Then
it is hard to reject any of them with finite sample. On the other hand, (iii) combines (i) and (ii), hence is
violated by 2δ, which is much easier to detect in a finite sample. y
Test statistics and critical values are constructed in a similar way based on Rpˆiobs, hence not repeated
here. We provide an analogous result of Theorem 4 in the main paper.
Theorem SA.2 (Validity of Critical Values with Limited Data I). Assume Assumption SA.1 holds. Let
Πobs be a class of choice rules restricted to S, and  a preference, such that: (i) for each piobs ∈ Πobs,
∈ Θpiobs ; and (ii) infpiobs∈Πobs min(σpiobs,) > 0. Then
lim sup
N→∞
sup
piobs∈Πobs
P [T () > cα()] ≤ α.
One natural question is whether it is possible to make any claim on Ξpiobs with limited data. Indeed, the
three tests remain valid when applied to Ξpiobs (i.e. controls size uniformly), which can be easily seen from
the fact that Ξpiobs ⊂ Θpiobs . We provide the following theorem. Also, for a choice rule pi defined on X , piobs
denotes its restriction to S.
Theorem SA.3 (Validity of Critical Values with Limited Data II). Assume Assumption SA.1 holds. Let
Π be a class of choice rules on X , and  a preference, such that: (i) for each pi ∈ Π, ∈ Ξpiobs ; and (ii)
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infpiobs∈Πobs min(σpiobs,) > 0. Then
lim sup
N→∞
sup
pi∈Π
P [T () > cα()] ≤ α.
In Theorem SA.3, we only need positive variance for moment conditions corresponding to the observed
components of the choice rule. The reason is simple: In constructing the tests and critical values, we never
use the unobserved part pi − piobs.
What is lost from Theorem SA.2 to Theorem SA.3? With limited data, there may exist ∈ Θpiobs −Ξpiobs
which is not rejected by the test statistic T () asymptotically.
SA.4.5 Other Critical Values
There are many proposals for constructing critical values in the literature of testing moment inequalities
(Canay and Shaikh, 2017; Ho and Rosen, 2017; Molinari, 2019, and references therein). Here we discuss
some of them for completeness. Throughout, let z? denote a random vector independent of the original data
and z? ∼ N (0, Ωˆ/N). To save notation, define (x)+ as the positive parts of x, and (x)− as the negative
parts multiplied by −1 (truncation above at zero).
Plug-in Method
The first method simply plugs-in an estimate of Rpi subject to the non-positivity constraint. Define
T ?PI() =
√
N ·max
(
(Rz? + (Rpˆi)−) σˆ
)
+
,
then the critical value with level α with the plug-in method is
cα,PI() = inf
{
t : P? [T ?PI() ≤ t] ≥ 1− α
}
,
where P? denotes probability operator conditional on the data, and in practice, it is replaced by the simulated
average M−1
∑M
m=1 1(·), where recall that T ?PI() is simulated M times.
We note the critical values obtained here are not uniformly valid in the sense of Theorem 4 in the main
paper.
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Least Favorable Model
The critical values are nondecreasing in the centering, hence a conservative method is to consider the least
favorable model, Rpi = 0, which assumes all the moment inequalities are binding. That is,
T ?LF() =
√
N ·max
(
(Rz?) σˆ
)
+
,
and
cα,LF() = inf
{
t : P? [T ?LF() ≤ t] ≥ 1− α
}
.
Undoubtedly, using such critical value may severely decrease the power of the test, especially when one
or two moment restrictions are violated and the rest are far from binding. Next we introduce two methods
seeking to improve power property of the test. The first one relies on the idea of moment selection, and the
third one replaces the unknown moment conditions with upper bounds.
Two-step Moment Selection
To illustrate this method, we first represent Rpˆi by its individual components, as {r′,`pˆi : 1 ≤ ` ≤ L},
where r′,` is the `-th row of R, so that there are in total L moment inequalities. The first step is to conduct
moment selection. Let 0 < β < α/3, and the following set of indices of “active moment restrictions”:
L =
{
` :
√
N · r
′
,`pˆi
σˆ,`
≥ −2 · cβ,LF()
}
,
then
T ?MS() =
√
N ·max
`∈L
(
r′,`z
?
σˆ,`
)
+
,
and the critical value is computed as
cα,MS() = inf
{
t : P? [T ?MS() ≤ t] ≥ 1− α+ 2β
}
.
Constructing the coupling statistic T ?(P∀) requires more delicate work. Note that simply taking max-
imum of individual T ?MS() does not work, mainly due to the two-step nature of the construction. More
precisely, the first step moment selection controls error probability to be β for each individual preference,
but not jointly, and the reason is that we used cβ,LF() for moment selection, which is too small jointly for
a collection of preferences.
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For a collection of preferences, the correct moment selection is the following:
L,P =
{
` :
√
N · r
′
,`pˆi
σˆ,`
≥ −2 · cβ,LF(P∀)
}
, for each ∈ P.
Now we use a much larger critical value for moment selection: cβ,LF(P∀) instead of cβ,LF(). Then the
coupling statistic is
T ?MS(P∀) =
√
N ·max
∈P
max
`∈L,P
(
r′,`z
?
σˆ,`
)
+
,
then the critical value is computed accordingly as the 1− α quantiles:
cα,MS(P∀) = inf
{
t : P? [T ?MS(P∀) ≤ t] ≥ 1− α+ 2β
}
.
See, for example, Chernozhukov, Chetverikov, and Kato (2019) and references therein.
Two-step Moment Upper Bounding
This method uses a first step to construct a confidence region for Rpi, and the upper bound of such region
is used as a conservative estimate for Rpi. Let 0 < β < α, and
T ?UB() =
√
N ·max
(
(Rz? + (Rpˆi + cβ,LF()σˆ/
√
N)−) σˆ
)
+
,
then
cα,UB() = inf
{
t : P? [T ?UB() ≤ t] ≥ 1− α+ β
}
.
Note that in the first step, we use the critical values from the least favorable method to construct upper
bounds on the moment inequalities Rpˆi+cβ,LF()σˆ/
√
N , which is guaranteed to have coverage 1−β. Then
the significance level in the second step is adjusted to account for errors incurred in the first step. See, e.g.,
Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) for further details. In particular, they recommend to use β/α = 0.1.
Same as the moment selection method, the upper bound (or confidence region for Rpi) constructed above
only controls error probability for individual preference, but not jointly for a collection of preferences. Hence
we need to make further adjustments. The solution is almost the same: replace the critical value used for
constructing upper bounds by one that controls error probability jointly for the collection P:
T ?UB(P∀) =
√
N ·max
∈P
max
(
(Rz? + (Rpˆi + cβ,LF(P∀)σˆ/
√
N)−) σˆ
)
+
,
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then the critical value is computed accordingly as the 1− α quantiles:
cα,UB(P∀) = inf
{
t : P? [T ?UB(P∀) ≤ t] ≥ 1− α+ β
}
.
SA.5 Additional Simulation Results
We first recall the simulation setup. We consider a class of logit attention rules indexed by ς:
µς(T |S) = wT,ς∑
T ′⊂S wT ′,ς
, wT,ς = |T |ς ,
where |T | is the cardinality of T . In this Supplemental Appendix, we give simulation evidence for ς ∈ {0, 1}.
As in the main paper, we list five hypotheses (preference orderings), and whether they are compatible
with our RAM model and specific values of φ.
ς = 0 φ
1 .95 .90 .85 .80 .75 .70 .65 .60 .55 .50
H0,1 : a1  a2  a3  a4  a5 X X X X X X X X X X X
H0,2 : a2  a3  a4  a5  a1 X X X X X X X × × × ×
H0,3 : a3  a4  a5  a2  a1 X X X X X X X × × × ×
H0,4 : a4  a5  a3  a2  a1 X X X X X X X × × × ×
H0,5 : a5  a4  a3  a2  a1 X X X X X X X × × × ×
ς = 1 φ
1 .95 .90 .85 .80 .75 .70 .65 .60 .55 .50
H0,1 : a1  a2  a3  a4  a5 X X X X X X X X X X X
H0,2 : a2  a3  a4  a5  a1 X X X X X X × × × × ×
H0,3 : a3  a4  a5  a2  a1 X X X X X X × × × × ×
H0,4 : a4  a5  a3  a2  a1 × × × × × × × × × × ×
H0,5 : a5  a4  a3  a2  a1 × × × × × × × × × × ×
With ς = 0 being the data generating process, we have the identified set to be the set of all preferences,
and for ς = 1, it is {: a3  a4  a5}. Simulation results are collected in Figure SA.1 and SA.2.
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(d) H0,4 : a4  a5  a3  a2  a1
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(e) H0,5 : a5  a4  a3  a2  a1
Shown in the figure are empirical rejection
probabilities testing the five null hypothesis
through 5,000 simulations, with nominal size
0.05. Logit attention rule with ς = 0 is used,
as described in the text. For each simulation
repetition, five effective sample sizes are con-
sidered 50, 100, 200, 300 and 400.
Figure SA.1. Empirical Rejection Probabilities (ς = 0)
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(a) H0,1 : a1  a2  a3  a4  a5
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(b) H0,2 : a2  a3  a4  a5  a1
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(c) H0,3 : a3  a4  a5  a2  a1
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(d) H0,4 : a4  a5  a3  a2  a1
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(e) H0,5 : a5  a4  a3  a2  a1
Shown in the figure are empirical rejection
probabilities testing the five null hypothesis
through 5,000 simulations, with nominal size
0.05. Logit attention rule with ς = 1 is used,
as described in the text. For each simulation
repetition, five effective sample sizes are con-
sidered 50, 100, 200, 300 and 400.
Figure SA.2. Empirical Rejection Probabilities (ς = 1)
28
